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ABSTRACT

A MACROECONOMIC APPROACH TO A FIRM’S CAPITAL
STRUCTURE

Mitsuru Katagiri

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde

In this paper, I investigate the logic behind cross sectional dispersion of ﬁrm’s capital
structure. I incorporate the trade oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs
into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and their endogenous
entry/exit, and compute an equilibrium ﬁrm distribution.
The main ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, I ﬁnd that the equilibrium distribution approximates the dispersion of ﬁrms’ capital structure well. Second, I ﬁnd that it
simultaneously accounts for the relationship of capital structure to proﬁtability and ﬁrm
size. The key mechanisms are the diﬀerence in responses to persistent and transitory productivity shocks and economies of scale. Third, I ﬁnd through counterfactual experiments
that even if the tax beneﬁts do not exist, ﬁrms would not signiﬁcantly change their capital
structure in contrast to previous works. The intuition is that, with ﬁrm’s entry/exit, young
ﬁrms always exist and use debt until they accumulate internal funding.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Many theoretical and empirical works have investigated the logic behind the distribution of
corporate capital structures, which is widespread and stable over time, as one of central research topics in Corporate Finance for a long time. Modigliani and Miller (1958), a seminal
classic paper in capital structure theory, argued that such a dispersion of leverage has nothing to do with ﬁrm’s optimization. However, numerous empirical works have found that
clear relationships between capital structure and other characteristics of ﬁrms such as size
and proﬁtability.1 These empirical relationships suggest that ﬁrms ultimately choose their
capital structure under some cost-beneﬁt analysis. Given these stylized facts, theoretical
works following Modigliani and Miller (1958) have investigated the cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure. Among others, the dynamic trade oﬀ theory, which
1

For example, Frank and Goyal (2008) and Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited (1990) discuss the distribution of leverage in the U.S. data. Rajan and Zingales (1995) use G7 countries’ cross sectional data and
investigate the cross sectional relationships of corporate capital structure to other corporate characteristics
such as proﬁtability and ﬁrm size. Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) use the U.S. ﬁrm
panel data and obtain similar results. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also uses the U.S. panel data
and emphasizes the ﬁxed eﬀect of each ﬁrm. Graham and Harvey (2001) collects extensive survey data
from CFOs of the U.S. ﬁrms and explore the key determinants of their capital structure decisions.

1

describes ﬁrms’ simultaneous choice of capital structure, investment, and payout under the
trade oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs, has succeeded in quantitatively
accounting for the empirical facts.2 While most papers based on the dynamic trade oﬀ
theory are very recent and still not well-developed to explain some empirical facts, this
theory is now the most promising one among theoretical models to quantitatively account
for corporate capital structure.
This paper constructs a structural model based on the dynamic trade oﬀ theory and
investigate the following quantitative questions which have not been fully investigated by
previous works. First, I examine whether the dynamic trade oﬀ theory can induce the
widespread dispersion of corporate capital structure observed in data. I cannot answer
this question by standard dynamic trade oﬀ models because most of them are partial equilibrium models focusing on a certain ﬁrm’s optimal behavior, and deriving a cross sectional
distribution in equilibrium is outside their scope. In order to overcome this shortcoming,
I extend the model to a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and
their endogenous entry/exit. By doing so, I obtain not only an optimal policy for each ﬁrm,
but also an equilibrium cross sectional distribution regarding ﬁrms’ characteristics.3 Then
I use the distribution as a natural counterpart of the empirical distribution for comparison.
Second, I examine whether the trade oﬀ theory account for the relationship of corporate
2

A traditional “static” trade oﬀ theory was one of the most popular theories to describe corporate
capital structure, but it was inconsistent with the negative relationship between ﬁrms’ leverage and their
proﬁtability observed in data. That is, according to the theory, proﬁtable ﬁrms should increase their
leverage because their probability of ﬁnancial distress is low and their tax beneﬁts are high. Recently,
introducing a dynamic aspect into the trade oﬀ theory makes it possible to distinguish the internal equity
from the outside equity and opens the door for the trade oﬀ theory to potentially explain the negative
relationship.
3
Another way to obtain a cross sectional distribution in a structural model is to generate simulated
data and construct a distribution by the data (e.g., Strebulaev (2007)). This approach does not consider
the distribution itself as an equilibrium, but it is conceptually very similar to the stationary equilibrium
approach in this paper.

2

capital structure to ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. I focus on the relationship with those two
variables because there is little disagreement on the relationships among empirical works.4
In particular, I focus on the following stylized facts about the relationship:
Fact 1 Correlation between proﬁtability and ﬁrm size is positive
Fact 2 Correlation between leverage and ﬁrm size is positive
Fact 3 Correlation between leverage and proﬁtability is positive, but it turns out to be
negative if the data is limited to large ﬁrms
Fact 4 Correlation between leverage and proﬁtability becomes negative after controlling
for ﬁrm size.
As far as I know, the structural models to simultaneously account for these stylized facts
do not exist. As potential mechanisms to explain those stylized facts, I incorporate the
following two features into the dynamic trade oﬀ model, transitory and persistent idiosyncratic productivities and economies of scale. While these features are common in other
literatures and justiﬁed by empirical works, they are not usually incorporated in dynamic
trade oﬀ models. In a quantitative part of this paper, I test whether the combination
of those two features and the trade oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs
quantitatively account for the stylized facts stated above.
Finally, I measure a relative importance between cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure. This question sounds a little bit ambitious because this is one of
4

In empirical works, a growth expectation measured by the market-to-book ratio is often considered
as one of determinants, but there is no agreement on the sign of their eﬀect on a book leverage among
empirical works. For example, while Fama and French (2002) argues that it is positive, Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) argues that it is negative. Frank and Goyal (2009) shows
the sign of the eﬀect varies over time and concludes that it is not stable over time.

3

the most recurrent questions in the corporate ﬁnance literature. I give some answer to this
question through counterfactual experiments. In the experiments, I drop frictions from the
baseline model one by one and recalculate the equilibrium. Then I measure the eﬀect of
the friction on corporate capital structure by comparing the new equilibrium values with
those in the baseline model.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are summarized as follows. First, I ﬁnd that the model’s
equilibrium distribution accounts for the dispersion of corporate capital structure observed
in the data. In particular, it accounts for the two notable features in data. Many ﬁrms
take very low leverage and the distribution is widespread.
Second, I ﬁnd that the equilibrium distribution also accounts for the stylized facts
regarding the relationship of capital structure to ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. In particular,
it accounts for the four stylized facts stated above. The logic behind the result in the model
is as follows. Fact 1 is induced just by the economies of scale. Fact 2 emerges in the model
as a kind of spurious correlation. It is induced by the fact that ﬁrms with high persistent
productivity get large and increase their leverage simultaneously. In the model, ﬁrms with
high persistent productivity increase their leverage because, ﬁrst, they invest more and
expand their ﬁnancing deﬁcit and, second, the debt market is more accessible to them
under the “trade oﬀ.” The ﬁrst part of Fact 3 is induced by the combination of Fact1 and
Fact2. To understand the logic behind the second part of Fact 3, the key mechanism is the
diﬀerence between responses to the persistent and transitory productivity shock. Firms
with a high persistent productivity increase their leverage as I explained above, but ﬁrms
with a high transitory productivity decrease their leverage because their internal funding
increases. Because the economies of scale caused by the ﬁxed cost is not relevant for
4

large ﬁrms, only the latter negative eﬀect remains when I measure the correlation between
leverage and proﬁtability using only large firm data. Similarly, Fact 4 is interpreted as
follows: When I add ﬁrm size as another explanatory variable in addition to proﬁtability,
the ﬁrm size controls for the eﬀect of the persistent productivity because ﬁrms with high
persistent productivity get large. Thus, the proﬁtability in the regression just captures the
eﬀect of transitory productivity, and have a negative eﬀect on leverage.
Finally, I discover the following implications about relative importance between determinants of capital structure through counterfactual experiments. First, even if the tax
beneﬁt does not exist, the aggregate and average leverage would not signiﬁcantly change.
This is in contrast to previous works. This contrast stems from the diﬀerence in the
assumptions about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. That is, without ﬁrms’ entry/exit as a standard dynamic trade oﬀ model, all ﬁrms would eventually use 100% equity by accumulating their
retained earnings when the tax beneﬁt does not exist; but with ﬁrms’ entry/exit, young
ﬁrms always exist and use debt in the process of accumulating their retained earnings. This
result implies that the wedge in equity funding caused by the dividend tax and the ﬂotation
cost of equity are also important determinants of capital structure. This may answer the
question why debt ﬁnance has been a pervasive funding way before the corporate income
tax was introduced.5 Second, the wedge in equity ﬁnance caused by the dividend tax and
the ﬂotation cost of equity has ambiguous eﬀects on leverage. They actually depend on
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position and proﬁtability. Rich and big ﬁrms decrease their leverage

5

Frank and Goyal (2008) says in their conclusion section that “The U.S. corporate income tax did not
begin until 1909 when it was introduced at a 1% rate. The use of debt contracts by businesses has a much
longer history than does the corporate income tax. Thus, while taxes probably play an important role,
there must be more to it.”

5

while poor and small ﬁrms increase their leverage when the wedge in equity ﬁnance exists. Third, the default cost makes debt ﬁnance unattractive, but even if it is eliminated,
the ﬁrm would continue to use some equity ﬁnance. Fourth, the investment irreversibility
magniﬁes the disadvantage of debt ﬁnance, but it would have no eﬀect on leverage if the
wedge in equity ﬁnance did not exist. Fifth, corporate income tax cuts have large eﬀects on
aggregate variables such as output and capital accumulation. Sixth, the elimination of the
default cost does not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the aggregate variables. This implies that
the eﬀect of the default cost on aggregate variables may be overemphasized in previous
literature.

6

Chapter 2

Related Literature
In this chapter, I survey the literatures related to the main chapter of the Ph.D. thesis
(called “the current paper,” hereafter). The objective of the current paper is to investigate cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure using a heterogeneous ﬁrm
model with the trade oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs, and to conduct
some policy experiments by the model. Roughly speaking, the current paper is related to
two diﬀerent literatures: One is corporate capital structure in corporate ﬁnance theory and
the other is a macroeconomic model with ﬁrm heterogeneity. I review these two literatures
one by one.

2.1

Corporate Capital Structure

In this subsection, I review the papers about corporate capital structure choice. First, I
select a small number of key classic papers in corporate capital structure theory. Some of
them are not directly related to the current paper, but it is worthwhile to review them
7

because they are starting points of the investigation in corporate capital structure. Second,
I review empirical papers about corporate capital structure. Since there are huge amount
of empirical papers in this ﬁeld, I choose the ones directly related to the current paper,
and summarize the stylized facts established by them. Finally, I review papers belonging
to the dynamic trade oﬀ literature. Since they are the most closely related works to the
current paper, I review each of them in detail.

2.1.1

Theories of Capital Structure

A starting point of the theoretical investigation in corporate capital structure is the irrelevance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1958). It argues that as long as ﬁrms maximize
just their value, the capital structure is irrelevant to their optimization problem. Because
this theorem assumes that there are no frictions such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency
costs, and asymmetric information, subsequent papers have tried to ﬁnd out which frictions make corporate capital structure relevant to ﬁrms and investigate their implications.
Frank and Goyal (2008) is a survey paper reviewing those theoretical developments.
While many papers have been proposed, the trade oﬀ theory is one of the most accepted theories about corporate capital structure. It argues that ﬁrms choose their optimal
capital structure given the trade oﬀ between the advantage and disadvantage of debt. The
advantage of debt basically comes from taxes. Miller (1977) is a classic paper investigating the relationship between debt and taxes. He thinks of interest income taxation and
dividend taxation as well as corporate income taxation, and derives formula about how
tax beneﬁts change along with the tax rates. On the other hand, the disadvantage of
debt comes from ﬁnancial distress costs such as default costs and ﬁre sale costs. These
8

costs discourage ﬁrms to use debt, because when ﬁrms are in ﬁnancial distress, they have
to bear those costs to pay back interest and/or principal of debt. In the trade oﬀ theory,
ﬁrms choose their capital structure under the advantage and disadvantage, and the current
paper basically adopts the trade oﬀ as one of determinants of corporate capital structure.
A testable implication of the trade oﬀ theory is that proﬁtable ﬁrms are more leveraged
because the tax beneﬁts are big and the expected ﬁnancial distress costs are low for profitable ﬁrms, but it is against the empirical evidence. I will review the empirical facts in
the next subsection.
The pecking order theory proposed by Myers (1984) is another accepted theory regarding corporate capital structure. It argues that ﬁrms prefer the internal funding the
most, and when the internal funding is not enough to ﬁnance their investment, they issue
debt. Only if ﬁrms cannot issue debt anymore because of the default risk or other ﬁnancial
distress costs, they issue equity. This theory is called the pecking order theory because
of this strict hierarchy. He shows that this pecking order in capital structure choice is
justiﬁed by asymmetric information between ﬁrms and investors as long as debt ﬁnance is
less sensitive to information asymmetricity than equity ﬁnance.
Stiglitz (1973) is the ﬁrst paper investigating the eﬀects of dividend taxation on corporate capital structure choice in a dynamic model. According to his model, with dividend
taxation, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior would be like the pecking order theory. The logic is
simple. Firms prefer internal funding the most because using internal funding enables
them to reduce dividends and cut back dividend tax payments. Also, ﬁrms would prefer
debt to equity because issuing debt instead of equity means the proﬁts will be distributed
to bond holders rather than equity holders in the future, and then ﬁrms will be able to
9

cut back dividend tax payments. The current paper introduces the dividend taxation in
the same manner, and the mechanism proposed in his model plays a key role to induce the
pecking order behavior in the current paper too.
Besides those major theories, there are many other models to explain corporate capital
structure choice. Ross (1977) argues that the signalling eﬀect of debt is a relevant determinant of capital structure. Since issuing debt sends a signal to investors that they are
good ﬁrms, he argues that they choose their capital structure considering the signalling
eﬀect. Stulz (1990) focuses on the trade oﬀ caused by the conﬂict between equity-holders
and managers. He argues that issuing debt prevents managers from diverting money to
private beneﬁts, but, on the other hand, it causes underinvestment. Brander and Lewis
(1986) emphasize the interaction between corporate capital structure and production markets. They argue that in an imperfect competition environment, issuing debt works as a
commitment to produce their products and carry beneﬁts through the responses by other
ﬁrms. Corresponding chapters of Tirole (2006) review those models in more detail.

2.1.2

Empirical Facts about Capital Structure

Corporate capital structure is also one of central topics in empirical works. There are huge
amount of empirical papers in this ﬁeld, and so I choose and review the papers having
direct implications to the current paper in this section. Then I extract the stylized facts
established by them, and tell about the relations to the current paper.
I start with the stylized facts about the distribution of leverage in raw data, which is one
of main focus of the current paper. Frank and Goyal (2008) is a great survey summarizing
the basic facts of the dispersion, and so I pick some facts which are closely related to the
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current paper from the survey. As for the cross sectional dispersion of leverage, they show
that many ﬁrms have very low leverage, say less than 10%. That is, many ﬁrms use no
debt ﬁnance at all. On the other hand, while the number of ﬁrms tends to decrease as
leverage increases, they also show that there exist ﬁrms taking more than 90% leverage.
As a result, the distribution of leverage is very widespread. In the current paper, it is
one of motivations whether the dispersion of leverage in the data can be replicated by an
economic model. As for the time series movement of leverage, Frank and Goyal (2008)
show that leverage in aggregate level is stationary over time, and remains around 30 %.
This fact encourages us to use stationary equilibrium approach when we analyze corporate
capital structure. Moreover, they compute the transition matrix of leverage and ﬁnd that
the time series movement of leverage in each ﬁrm level is also stable. That is, they show
that ﬁrms with high (low) leverage tend to have high (low) leverage in the next period too.
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also shows that high (low) levered ﬁrms tend to be
high (low) levered for a long time. They use U.S. ﬁrm panel data in recent 40 years, and
ﬁnd that the autocorrelation process of corporate capital structure is very persistent over
time, and most part of corporate capital structure can be explained by a time invariant
ﬁxed eﬀect of each ﬁrm. While those papers do not compare the process of leverage with
other processes, the autocorrelation of ﬁrm size measured by labor or asset is actually
more persistent than that of leverage. Therefore, it is natural to guess that the leverage
and ﬁrm size processes are governed by the same very persistent latent variable (i.e., ﬁrm’s
productivity) rather than there exist adjustment costs for rebalancing corporate capital
structure.
As I explained in the previous section, a number of theories are proposed to account for
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the cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure. Among others, the current
paper is based on the trade oﬀ argument between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs,
and so an important strand of empirical works is the estimation of these two things: the tax
beneﬁts and the ﬁnancial distress costs. Graham (2000) is a seminal paper in the estimation
of tax beneﬁts. He estimates each ﬁrm’s tax beneﬁt, which is basically generated by the
gap between tax rates on corporate income and personal interest income. He argues that
because the estimated tax beneﬁt is much bigger than conventional estimates of ﬁnancial
distress costs, it is diﬃcult to justify corporate capital structure choices observed in data by
the trade oﬀ. He also ﬁnds that large and proﬁtable ﬁrms use debt conservatively, which
is against the implication of trade oﬀ theory. A number of papers, on the other hand,
estimate ﬁnancial distress costs including default costs and ﬁre sale costs. As for default
costs, the world bank measures them all over the world and publishes the result as a part of
“Doing Business” database. They basically accumulate fees for default procedures such as
attorney fees and court fees, and conclude that the default cost in the U.S. is about 7% of
the defaulted ﬁrm’s estate. See Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) for how they
construct the database. As for ﬁre sale costs (i.e., the degree of investment irreversibility),
there are some empirical works, but the estimation results vary across them a little. The
lower bound is the estimate by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). They construct a structural
model and estimate the discount rate of asset sale by indirect inference using plant level
data in the U.S. The result is that ﬁrms discount the price of their assets like the machine
for production by about 20% when they sell them. The upper bound is the estimate by
Ramey and Shapiro (2001). They also estimate the discount rate of asset sale using aero
space industry data. According to their estimation, the cost varies among the types of
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assets, but it is around 60%. In the current paper, I use the default cost by the world
bank and the median value of ﬁre sale cost, say 40%. Finally, let me mention whether
those ﬁnancial distress costs are smaller than tax beneﬁts for most ﬁrms as is argued by
Graham (2000). In order to answer the question, it is important to estimate the marginal
increase of default probability with respect to leverage ratio because we need to use expected
ﬁnancial distress cost for the comparison. However, it is not straightforward to estimate it
because high leverage induces high default probability, but, at the same time, ﬁrms with
low default probability tend to have high leverage. Molina (2005) estimates the marginal
eﬀect of leverage on the expected ﬁnancial distress costs using some instrument variables,
and shows that the marginal increases in expected ﬁnancial distress costs is big enough to
oﬀset tax beneﬁts.
To investigate the cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure, the most
straightforward way is to ask ﬁrms about their ﬁnancial strategy directly. Graham and
Harvey (2001) collects survey data from CFOs of U.S. ﬁrms and investigate which determinants are relatively important for corporate capital structure choice. This survey contains
a lot of results, so I pick several results relevant to the current papers. First, they ﬁnd
that “ﬁnancial ﬂexibility” and “a good credit rating” are the top two determinants of debt
policy. They interpret “ﬁnancial ﬂexibility” as a precautionary motive related to future
interest payment obligation and “a good credit rating” as an indication of their concern
about ﬁnancial distress costs. They also ﬁnd that the “ﬁnancial ﬂexibility” is nothing
to do with asymmetric information. Second, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms do not care transaction costs when they issue debt. They argues that it is against the hypothesis by Fischer,
Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). Third, they ﬁnd that the following determinants do not seem
13

important: Conﬂict between bond-holders and equity-holders, conﬂict between managers
and equity-holders, productioin market, and a debt level of competitors. Fourth, only a
start-up ﬁrm considers equity as a cheap source of funds. All the results are just anecdotal
evidences, but it is worthwhile to check whether the results of the current model do not
contradict to those evidences.
Next, I talk about the empirical relationships between capital structure and other ﬁrms’
characteristics such as ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. These empirical relationships are just
relationships between endogenous variables and do not directly tell anything about the
cross sectional determinants, but they can be used in order to check the model validity
by seeing whether the model can account for those empirical relationships or not. To
investigate the empirical relationships, empirical researchers use ﬁrm level data in various
countries and periods. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) uses G7 countries’ cross
sectional data, and Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) use the U.S. ﬁrm
panel data of COMPUSTAT. They put slightly diﬀerent set of variables in the regressions,
but they regress the reduced form equation like the following one:

Book Leveragei = β0 + β1 ROAi + β2 log(Employeei ) + β3 Market-to-Book Ratioi + ϵi

ROA, the number of employees, and market-to-book ratio are used as proxies of profitability, ﬁrm size, and growth expectation, respectively. The empirical papers share the
following estimation results:
β1 < 0 and

β2 > 0

That is, the coeﬃcient on the proﬁtability measured by ROA is negative and the coeﬃcient
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on the ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees (or asset size) is positive. The sign
of the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrms’ growth expectation measured by market-to-book ratio, β3 , is
controversial. For example, while Fama and French (2002) argues that it is positive, Rajan
and Zingales (1995) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) argues that it is negative.
Frank and Goyal (2009) shows the sign of the relationship varies over time and concludes
that the estimation result is not stable. Therefore, in the current paper, I just focus on
the relationships of leverage to proﬁtability and ﬁrm size, and use them as stylized facts
to be explained.1
The negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability has particularly received
much attention from theoretical researchers because this negative relationship is puzzling
in the light of the trade oﬀ theory. This is because the tax beneﬁt is big and the probability of ﬁnancial distress is low for proﬁtable ﬁrms. Recently, introducing a dynamic
aspect enables the trade oﬀ theory to potentially account for the negativity. I will talk
about this “dynamic” trade oﬀ theory in the next section in detail. On the other hand,
the other relationship, the relationship between leverage and ﬁrm size, is hardly analyzed
by theoretical models, and, as a result, few models account for both relationships simultaneously. However, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) mentions, the magnitude of the negative
relationship between leverage and proﬁtability is much stronger for big ﬁrms than small
ﬁrms. In the current papers, I also investigate such size dependency of the relationship
between leverage and proﬁtability.
Finally, let me mention the empirical tests for the pecking order theory. The current
paper does not incorporate the original version of the pecking order theory, which is induced
1
Tangibility of asset also has a clear positive relationship with leverage, but I do not mention tangibility
of asset in the current paper because it is diﬃcult to incorporate the concept of tangibility into the model.
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by asymmetric information, but incorporate other mechanisms including dividend taxation
to induce the pecking order behavior. Therefore, it is worthwhile to review those empirical
papers about tests of the pecking order theory because they give some important and
testable stylized facts. There are two key notions in the empirical investigation of the
pecking order theory. The ﬁrst one is “ﬁnancial deﬁcit,” which is deﬁned as the investment
minus the internal funding.2 The pecking order theory argues that the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is
ﬁlled by debt rather than equity. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tests this argument by
the regressing the increase in debt on the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, and ﬁnds that the coeﬃcient
on the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is close to one, which is consistent with the pecking order theory.
However, Frank and Goyal (2003) extends the data to small ﬁrms and conducts the ShyamSunder and Myers test. They ﬁnd that the pecking order theory ﬁts well for large ﬁrms,
but poorly for small ﬁrms. That is, small ﬁrms use outside equity rather than debt to ﬁll
the ﬁnancing deﬁcit. Lemmon and Zender (2009) focus on “debt capacity,” which is the
second key notion in this literature. The debt capacity is deﬁned as the maximum amount
of debt that the ﬁrm can borrow. Thus, when ﬁrms need to borrow more than the debt
capacity, ﬁrms would use outside equity. They assume that ﬁrms with debt ratings have
more debt capacity than ﬁrms with no debt ratings, because they are more accessible to
public debt markets. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms with no debt rating tend to issue outside equity
by violating the pecking order when their ﬁnancing deﬁcit is large. Because ﬁrms with no
debt ratings are usually small, rapid growth, young, and less proﬁtable ﬁrms, their result
is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003). Leary and Roberts (2010) also get the same
results regarding the characteristics of ﬁrms which violate the pecking order theory. They
2

Some people call it “ﬁnaicial gap.”
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also ﬁnd that the plain pecking order theory ﬁts the data very poorly, but the ﬁt drastically
improves once controlling for other determinants proposed by the trade oﬀ theory. In sum,
these empirical papers testing the pecking order theory give the following testable stylized
facts: First, the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is basically ﬁlled by debt. Second, small, rapid growth,
young, and less proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to issue outside equity by violating the pecking order.
It is worthwhile to check whether the implications of the current model do not contradict
to these facts.

Lastly, let me mention the implication of the fact that the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is mainly
ﬁlled by debt. If this is the case, it would be diﬃcult for the trade oﬀ model to account
for the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability. This is because proﬁtable
ﬁrms tend to invest more and expand their ﬁnancing deﬁcit, and then they have higher
leverage. It means that it is much more demanding to account for the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability under endogenous investment assumption than
exogenous one. As I will state in the next section, most dynamic trade oﬀ models with
adjustment costs of capital structure assume the exogenous corporate investment. Leary
and Roberts (2005) estimates a hazard function of capital structure change, and argues
that the costly rebalancing assumption can explain ﬁrms’ dynamic rebalancing of capital
structure well after controlling for internal funding and investment expenditure. Therefore, it is not obvious whether the results established by the dynamic trade oﬀ models with
exogenous investment are still valid under endogenous investment setting.
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2.1.3

Dynamic Trade Oﬀ Theory

In this section, I review papers belonging to the dynamic trade oﬀ literature, which is
the most closely related literature to the current paper. Those papers have the following
features in common.
1. Firms endogenously choose their capital structure under the trade oﬀ between tax
beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs,
2. Firms solve a dynamic optimization problem with uncertainty.
The second feature makes this literature diﬀerent from the traditional static trade-oﬀ
models. As I explain below, introducing the dynamic aspect enables the trade oﬀ model to
replicate some cross sectional stylized facts, which are considered as puzzling in the light
of the traditional static trade oﬀ model. In particular, the negative relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability is considered as inconsistent with the trade oﬀ theory, but it is
not necessarily inconsistent in a dynamic setting. In the rest of this section, I review the
papers belonging to the dynamic trade oﬀ models one by one.
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) is a pioneering paper in this literature. They
assume that ﬁrms’ value exogenously follows a stochastic path, and given the ﬁrm value,
ﬁrms choose their debt structure. Since they assume an adjustment cost for rebalancing
the capital structure, ﬁrms’ capital structure does not respond until their leverage ratio
reaches the upper or lower thresholds for recapitalization (so called, (s, S) inventory control
problem). Thus, ﬁrms do not have a target value of leverage but have a target range of
leverage, and, as a result, their leverage ratios change infrequently and swing over time as
in data.
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Strebulaev (2007) uses a similar model setting to Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989)
and tries to replicate the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability. He
generates artiﬁcial panel data by similar quantitative method to the current paper and tests
cross sectional implications including the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability.
A basic mechanism in his paper is that even though the ﬁrm’s optimal leverage is positively
correlated with its proﬁtability, the actual leverage could be negatively correlated with its
proﬁtability because the leverage may deviate from its optimal level due to adjustment
costs for rebalancing the capital structure. Unlike the current paper, the model cannot
say anything about the relationship between ﬁrm sizes and leverage because corporate
investment is totally exogenous. As a result, his paper cannot consider any eﬀects of
the ﬁnancing deﬁcit (gap between investment and internal fund) on leverage at all even
though it is said to be an important determinant of capital structure in empirical papers.
Therefore, it is not obvious whether the relationships replicated in his model are still valid
under endogenous corporate investment.
While most dynamic trade oﬀ models assume only a persistent stochastic shock to ﬁrms’
cash ﬂow or value, Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010) assumes a temporary shock in addition
to a persistent shock as the current paper does. They focus on the fact that the volatility
of asset value is much lower than that of cash ﬂow, and shows that the temporary shock
can induce the diﬀerence between these volatilities. The main contribution of their paper
is that such volatile corporate earnings make debt riskier and less attractive than assumed
in a standard dynamic trade oﬀ model, and resolve the low leveraged puzzle proposed by
Graham (2000). The same eﬀect is crucial to replicate low leverage in the current paper
too, but, in addition to this eﬀect, the temporary shock also plays a key role to replicate
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the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability in the current paper.
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) focuses on the relationship between leverage and ﬁrm
size as the current paper. They still assume exogenous investment and payout policy, but
incorporate a ﬁxed cost to adjust capital structure in addition to a proportional cost. As
a result of the ﬁxed cost, very small ﬁrms do not use debt at all in their model because
the ﬁxed cost to lever up is too expensive, and then those unleveraged small ﬁrms induce
the positive relationship between leverage and ﬁrm size. On the other hand, the logic of
the current paper to account for the positive relationship between leverage and ﬁrm size
is much simpler: Productive ﬁrms optimally invest more and expand their size. At the
same time, because those productive ﬁrms tend to have large ﬁnancing deﬁcit and are more
accessible to debt markets, their leverage tend to be higher.
All papers up to this point assume that corporate earnings, investment, and payout
are totally exogenous. As I stated above, it is doubtful whether the results replicated by
the models with the exogenous investment assumption are valid without the assumption
because they do not consider the eﬀect of ﬁnancing deﬁcit, which is said to be an important
determinant of corporate capital structure. Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007) are breakthrough papers in this literature because they assume endogenous investment and payout
policy as well as endogenous capital structure choice. They assume a realistic tax system
and ﬁnancial distress costs, and account for the negative relationship between leverage and
proﬁtability under the trade oﬀ. The most important diﬀerence between their paper and
the current paper is that their model is a partial equilibrium model focusing on a certain
ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure choice while the current paper is a general equilibrium
model with entry/exit. Therefore, their model cannot consider the eﬀect of ﬁrm evolution
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on leverage, and it induces a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the results of counterfactual analysis.
Also, since they do not consider the decomposition of productivity and economies of scale,
it is likely that their model cannot replicate the relationship of leverage to proﬁtability and
ﬁrm size, simultaneously.
Tserlukevich (2008) also replicates the negative relationship between leverage and profitability by the model with endogenous investment. In his model, ﬁrms’ investment responds to proﬁtability shocks less frequently due to investment irreversibility, and so the
positive proﬁtability shocks just increase the equity value and decrease their leverage in
many cases. Therefore, their leverage negatively correlated with their proﬁtability even
though ﬁrms lever up when they invest. His argument is theoretically clear, but obviously
needs very severe investment irreversibility. The degree of investment irreversibility is 60%
at most in empirical papers as I stated, but he assumes 100% investment irreversibility in
the quantitative part of his paper. Thus, it seems diﬃcult to quantitatively explain the
negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability only by this mechanism.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) incorporates an exogenous debt capacity into
a dynamic trade oﬀ model with endogenous investment and payout, and account for very
conservative leverage behavior, which is consistent with Graham (2000). In their model,
ﬁrms tend to keep their debt capacity for future funding needs because outside equity is
more costly than debt. Thus ﬁrms do not completely ﬁll their ﬁnancing deﬁcit by debt
as in data. The current paper has the same mechanism, but the ﬁrm’s debt capacity
is endogenously determined in the current paper. That is, in the current paper, ﬁrms
take a conservative leverage behavior because debt becomes more costly than internal and
external equity funding as they lever up.
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Finally, let me mention a criticism to the dynamic trade oﬀ models. Welch (2010) argues
that dynamic trade oﬀ models should be tested by out-of-samples or quasi-experiments to
validate their quantitative results in addition to in-sample moments. Moreover, he argues
that it seems impossible for quantitative structural models like dynamic trade oﬀ models
to specify all of the key determinants of corporate capital structure because there are so
many determinants. He concludes that a simple reduced form model is more suitable for
corporate ﬁnance than a complicated structural quantitative model.

2.2

Macroeconomic Model with Firm Heterogeneity

Next I move on to the other literature related to the current paper: heterogeneous ﬁrm
model. In the current paper, I adopt a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms as a baseline model, and then introduce a number of frictions including investment
irreversibility, ﬁnancial contract with costly defaults, and taxes. These frictions correspond
to the ones assumed in a dynamic trade oﬀ theory, and make the capital structure relevant
to ﬁrms’ optimization.
There are two seminal classic papers in this literature. The ﬁrst one is Hopenhayn
(1992). He constructs a partial equilibrium model where each ﬁrm faces persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks and chooses to stay or exit in every period. He proposes a
concept of “stationary equilibrium as an equilibrium concept of the economy. In the stationary equilibrium, each ﬁrm actively entries/exits and evolves in response to the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, but the whole economy is stationary over time and characterized by
a time invariant distribution of ﬁrms (so called, a stationary distribution) because ﬁrms’
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entry/exit and expansion/shrink are oﬀset each other. He shows that the stationary equilibrium with positive mass of ﬁrms’ entry/exist exists under some weak conditions. The
other seminal paper in this literature is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). They introduce
a household sector into the Hopenhayn-model and extend the model to a dynamic general
equilibrium model.

A key assumption to characterize the stationary equilibrium in heterogeneous ﬁrm
models is a decreasing return to scale of the production function. If the production function
is constant return to scale as a standard neoclassical growth model, the most productive
ﬁrm would keep all resources and any ﬁrm heterogeneity would not exit. In the current
paper, I assume that the production function is decreasing return to scale according to this
conventional wisdom.

The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, I review the papers that account
for some basic ﬁrms’ characteristics including their entry/exit, life-cycle, and size distribution by a heterogeneous ﬁrm model. Second, I focus on some papers that account for
ﬁrms’ behavior towards corporate investment and capital structure like the current paper.
Since they are very closely related to the current papers, I review each paper one by one in
detail. Third, I review the papers about resource misallocation. The current paper is not
directly related to the resource misallocation between ﬁrms, but I pick some seminal papers
and review their motivation and contributions because it is the most growing literature for
a heterogeneous ﬁrm model. Finally, I brieﬂy review some other ﬁelds of study where a
heterogeneous ﬁrm model is applied.
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2.2.1

Firm’s Life-Cycle, Entry/Exit, and Size Distribution

Some stylized facts about ﬁrm heterogeneity in terms of the life cycle, entry/exit and
size distribution have been established by micro data of ﬁrms. For example, Business
Dynamics Statistics at the U.S. Census Bureau shows, for example, that the exit rates are
higher for small and young ﬁrms than large and old ones, the ﬁrm size distribution is stable
over time, young ﬁrms’ size distribution is more skewed rightward than that of old ﬁrms,
and so on. Some empirical papers use other countries’ micro data of ﬁrms (e.g., Cabral
and Mata (2003) for Portuguese data, Angelini and Generale (2008) for Italian data, and
Mukoyama (2009) for Japanese data) to establish the stylized facts in those countries.
Since Hopenhayn (1992) provides a great vehicle to think of ﬁrm heterogeneity, one of
natural questions using his model is whether a heterogeneous ﬁrm model can account for
those stylized facts. Some classic papers including Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) obtain
results which are roughly consistent with those stylized facts, but some recent papers
construct more sophisticated models and try to account for ﬁrms’ behavior more precisely.

Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) investigates a ﬁrm’s life cycle (that is, ﬁrms are born as small
ones, grow as time goes on, and eventually exit from the economy) by an overlapping
generation model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In particular, they focus on the process of
organization capital : the accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. They show that their model
can account for the age dependency of employment, job creation, and job destruction in
the U.S. ﬁrms fairly well, and argue that the payment to the organization capital accounts
for about 40% of payment to intangible assets.
24

Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) investigates size dependency of ﬁrm’s behavior
by incorporating industry-speciﬁc human capital accumulation into a heterogeneous ﬁrm
model. By doing so, the ﬁrm’s technololy becomes decreasing return to scale with respect
to capital, and, as a result, their model exhibits a “mean reversion” of ﬁrm’s characteristics. Since this “mean reversion” induces the negative correlation between ﬁrm size and
growth rate, their model obtains the result that the size distribution has thinner tails than
Preto distribution particularly in capital intensive sectors as is observed in data.3
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) investigates the size (age) dependency of ﬁrm’s behavior
among ﬁrms with the same age (size). First, they show that without any ﬁnancial frictions
or persistency of productivity shocks, ﬁrm’s behavior would be independent of its age after
controlling for its size. Next, they explicitly incorporate a debt contract with endogenous
defaults between the ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁrms. By doing so, ﬁrm’s equity becomes a state variable in addition to its productivity because it has an eﬀect on its credit
availability. Then, as the ﬁrm age is correlated with the level of equity, the simultaneous
dependencies emerge.4 Methodologically, this is the ﬁrst paper which incorporates ﬁnancial
intermediaries and one-period debt contract with endogenous defaults into a heterogeneous
ﬁrm model.5 Subsequent papers including Hennessy and Whited (2007), Gilchrist, Sim,
3
Even though the ﬁrm size distribution has thinner tails than Pareto distribution in data, there are a
number of papers arguing that the ﬁrm size distribution theoretically has to follow Pareto distribution (so
called, Zipf’s law). See Luttmer (2010) for a survey of this literature.
4
There are some empirical papers about the relationship between ﬁrm size distribution and ﬁnancial
constraints. Cabral and Mata (2003) shows that the rightward skewness can be explained by ﬁnancial
frictions rather than a selection mechanism. Angelini and Generale (2008) show that ﬁnancial frictions are
signiﬁcant determinants to account for the ﬁrm size distribution, particularly for small and young ﬁrms,
but they also show that ﬁnancial frictions have a limited explanatory power to a ﬁrm size distribution in
ﬁnancially developed countries like OECD countries.
5
It is common in business cycle literature to incorporate the same type of one-period debt contract
into a dynamic general equilibrium model (e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999)). Gale and Hellwig (1985) shows that the one-period debt contract would be optimal
among general one-period contracts in a static model if there exists a monitoring cost (or a default cost),
but, unfortunately, in a dynamic model with persistent shocks such as Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and
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and Zakrajsek (2010) and the current paper utilize the contractual environment of a risky
debt proposed by this model.
Firm’s entry and exit has been analyzed in a stationary setting, but its behavior over
the business cycle attracts more attentions recently. Campbell (1998) is a classic paper
about this topic. He describes that both entry and exit rates are positively correlated with
business cycles, and, in particular, exit rates lead the productivity growth. He constructs
a structural model and solves it by a linear-quadratic approximation, and then accounts
for those pro-cyclicality.
Samaniego (2008) constructs a similar heterogeneous ﬁrm model and solves it by nonlinear method. He considers a deviation from the stationary equilibrium as an aggregate
productivity shock, and computes a deterministic transition path in which the economy
returns to the stationary equilibrium. He documents that while entry and exit rates are
pro-cyclical, the magnitude of their eﬀects on aggregate variables including output and
employment is negligible.
It is very hard to incorporate an aggregate productivity shock into heterogeneous ﬁrm
models with entry and exit because of the “curse of dimensionality” problem in general, but
recently Clementi and Palazzo (2010) uses an approximation method proposed by Krussel
and Smith (1998) to investigate the role of entry and exit over the business cycle, and ﬁnds
out that ﬁrm’s entry and exit ampliﬁes the ﬂuctuations in aggregate variables. While I
assume that there is no aggregate shock in the current paper, it is a promising extension
to incorporate the aggregate shock by using the method in their paper.

the current paper, their result cannot be directly applied. Thus, as long as I know, it is an open question
whether a debt contract is optimal in those models.
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2.2.2

Corporate Investment and Capital Structure

The most closely related application ﬁeld of heterogeneous ﬁrm models to the current paper
is the literature of corporate investment and capital structure. Gomes (2001) investigates
whether ﬁnancial constraints induce the cash ﬂow eﬀect in corporate investment. He constructs a heterogeneous ﬁrm model with entry and exit and incorporates a ﬂotation cost of
equity as a ﬁnancial constraint. He derives a stationary distribution in the equilibrium, and
then randomly generates artiﬁcial cross sectional data from the distribution for comparison
with the empirical results. He concludes that the cash ﬂow eﬀect on investment is nothing
to do with ﬁnancial constraints, but caused just by measurement errors. The current paper
actually uses the same quantitative methodology to test cross sectional implications.
Khan and Thomas (2008) investigates why the aggregate investment over business cycles is relatively smooth while the investment of individual ﬁrm is “lumpy.” They show
that the aggregate investment is as lumpy as the investment of individual ﬁrms in a partial equilibrium model, but this lumpiness in the aggregate investment disappears when
the model is extended to a general equilibrium model because general equilibrium eﬀects
dampen the response of investment. Methodologically, this is the ﬁrst paper which incorporates an aggregate productivity shock into heterogeneous ﬁrm models. They basically
apply the method proposed by Krussel and Smith (1998). The method used in their paper to approximate the aggregate state is adopted in subsequent papers including Bloom,
Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010) and Gomes and Schmid (2010).
Miao (2005) investigates corporate capital structure and entry/exit behavior by the
stationary equilibrium approach as the current paper. He constructs a general equilibrium
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model with endogenous corporate capital structure choice and default, and accounts for
some stylized facts and conducts counterfactual experiments. This paper is the most closely
related to the current paper in the sense of motivation, but, unlike the current paper, he
makes several drastic simpliﬁcations to obtain closed form solutions. For example, he
assumes a perpetual bond which pays a ﬁxed amount of coupon, and the amount of the
bond is ﬁxed after they enter the economy. Moreover, he considers only a corporate income
tax as a relevant tax for ﬁrms, and assumes that ﬁrms never choose to pay dividends. The
current paper, on the other hand, focuses on quantitative solutions under more realistic
circumstance while it does not give closed form solutions.6

Gomes and Schmid (2010) investigate credit spreads, equity premium, and capital structure simultaneously by a heterogeneous ﬁrm model with aggregate productivity shocks.
They extend a standard heterogeneous ﬁrm model with entry and exit so that ﬁrms endogenously choose their capital structure. At the same time, however, they abstract from
many aspects for simplicity. For example, they assume that the size and structure of ﬁrms’
balance sheet is ﬁxed once it is decided when ﬁrms enter the economy. They show that the
model accounts for the level of credit spread as well as corporate leverage, equity premium,
and business cycle statistics. Their result implies that aggregate productivity shocks play
an important role to explain those things simultaneously. The current paper can deﬁne
credit spreads inside the model too, but since the current paper does not incorporate an
aggregate shock, it is not surprising that it cannot account for the level of credit spread.

6
In the conclusion part of his paper, he said that introducing a dynamic capital structure choice as the
current paper does is one of promising future extensions of his paper.
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2.2.3

Resource Misallocation and Macroeconomy

As some empirical papers show, resource allocation is an important aspect to account
for the measured TFP in a whole economy. In response to the accumulation of such
empirical evidences, resource (mis)allocation is now becoming one of the most growing
literatures for heterogeneous ﬁrm models. I discuss the literature in two parts below:
resource misallocation by ﬁnancial allocation and that by other reasons.
As for the resource misallocation due to ﬁnancial frictions, Buera and Shin (2010)
explores how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the convergence to the steady state economy. They
construct a heterogeneous agent model with an occupational choice: people can either
produce by their own technology or work as a labor force. They consider the case that
the resource is misallocated by some distortions such as taxes or other government policies
in the initial state. They show that the economy would converge to a new steady state
when the distortions are eliminated, but ﬁnancial frictions slow down the speed of the
convergence. This is because, with ﬁnancial frictions, people need to accumulate the assets
for collateral use in order to fund for production.
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) investigates the diﬀerence in TFP between developed
and developing countries. In particular, they focus on the fact that the diﬀerence in TFP
is bigger in the sector where the economy of scale is large. They use an occupational
choice model similar to Buera and Shin (2010), and extend it to two-sector model, where
these sectors are diﬀerent in terms of the degree of scale economy. Their main argument
is that ﬁnancial frictions are more relevant in the sector with large scale economy like the
manufacturing sector because people need to use more capital for producing their products
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eﬃciently. Therefore, since people with high ability cannot operate due to the ﬁnancial
friction, TFP would be depressed through talent misallocation.
Moll (2010) constructs a heterogeneous agent model with collateral constraint and
accounts for the output diﬀerence between countries with diﬀerent degree of ﬁnancial
frictions. In particular, in his model, the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
plays a key role to determine the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions. If it’s not persistent, ﬁnancial
frictions do not have any eﬀects on capital allocation and aggregate output because people
can ﬁnance their investment by their own savings eventually.
Midrigan and Xu (2010) also investigates the relationship between aggregate TFP
and resource misallocation. In particular, they focus on how much the misallocation is
quantitatively explained by ﬁnancial frictions. They construct a heterogeneous agent model
where people are forced to fund their operational costs in advance, and incorporate ﬁnancial
frictions as a collateral constraint. They show that the ﬁnancial friction could generate the
big diﬀerence in TFP, but under plausible calibration values, the TFP diﬀerence through
the misallocation caused by the ﬁnancial friction in their model is too small to account for
the TFP diﬀerence in data.7
As for the resource misallocation due to other reasons, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
investigates how the introduction of a ﬁring tax aﬀects the aggregate variables such as
output and labor productivity. They calibrate the model without the ﬁring tax by U.S.
micro data, and then introduce the ﬁring tax and compare the stationary equilibriums
before and after the introduction of the tax. They show that the ﬁring tax decreases
output through decrease in employment because the ﬁring tax increases the labor cost.
7
This result is consistent with Buera and Shin (2010), which argues that it is impossible to generate the
diﬀerence in TFP between developed and developing countries only by ﬁnancial frictions.
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Also, and more importantly, the ﬁring tax decreases output through decline in productivity
too because the ﬁring tax disrupts smooth reallocation of labor force between ﬁrms. As
a whole, while introduction of the ﬁring tax reduces the ﬂuctuation of employment, it
induces a substantial decrease in output.

Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) investigates how resource distortions induce decline in
measured TFP by a very standard heterogeneous ﬁrm model with capital and labor. They
introduce output taxation as a source of distortion and see its eﬀect on TFP and output.
First, they show that if the tax rate is uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity, the
distortion is not that big, but if it is positively correlated (i.e., productive ﬁrms are taxed
more), the distortion is pretty big. For example, when the tax rate is equal to 40%,
the uncorrelated distortion induces just 8% decline in TFP, but the correlated distortion
induces 31% decline in TFP.

Gourio (2008) investigates the eﬀect of reallocation induced by removal of a capital
adjustment cost. In particular, he emphasizes how much the eﬀect changes if ﬁrm’s productivity process is incorrectly speciﬁed. He constructs a heterogeneous ﬁrm model with
permanent, persistent and transitory idiosyncratic productivity shocks. He utilizes the
fact that corporate investment responds to the persistent shocks rather than the transitory shocks to identify those productivity shocks by micro data, and estimates the model
parameters by the simulated method of moment. He puts those estimated parameters
into a general equilibrium model with ﬁrm heterogeneity, and show that the diﬀerence in
speciﬁcation of the productivity process signiﬁcantly aﬀects the eﬀect of the removal of a
capital adjustment cost.
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2.2.4

Other Applicatioins

There are some other ﬁelds of study where heterogeneous ﬁrm models are used. The
ﬁrst ﬁeld is ﬁrm’s pricing behavior. Golosov and Lucas (2007) investigates the “price
stickiness” observed in data by incorporating an adjustment cost for changing prices (i.e.,
a menu cost). They argue that their model is more natural than Calvo-type model because,
in their model, ﬁrms with prices far from the optimal level tend to change the prices while,
in Calvo-type model, ﬁrms change the prices regardless of their current prices. They show
that the eﬀect of monetary policy on output in their model is much smaller than that
in the model with Calvo-type price setting (e.g., New Keynesian model) because of this
selection mechanism.

Midrigan (2010) also measures the eﬀect of monetary policy by a heterogeneous ﬁrm
model with a menu cost. He shows that Golosov and Lucas (2007) cannot account for
heterogeneity in the size of price changes and temporary price changes. In order to replicate
those features, ﬁrst, he assumes two types of prices: regular prices and posted prices.
Then he also assumes a scale economy only for the regular price change and a fat-tail
distribution for idiosyncratic cost shocks. These assumptions not only enable the model
account for those features, but also induce a much bigger eﬀect of monetary policy than
that in a standard menu cost model. This is because, ﬁrst, there are fewer ﬁrms around the
threshold when the distribution of cost shocks has a fat-tail, and second, a scale economy
makes the size of most price changes smaller.

The second ﬁeld is about the uncertainty shock. Bloom (2009) deﬁnes the uncertainty
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shock as changes in volatility of idiosyncratic productivity shocks of each ﬁrm, and investigates their eﬀect on aggregate labor and output. First, he shows by VAR that the
uncertainty shock induces a sharp decline in a short term and an overshoot in a medium
term in output and aggregate employment. Then he constructs a heterogeneous ﬁrm model
with investment and labor irreversibility, and shows that the model accounts for the response to the uncertainty shock. The intuition of the sharp decline is that increases in
volatility expand the inaction area caused by the irreversibility, and, as a result, decrease
Solow residual due to misallocation between plants. On the other hand, because increases
in volatility enhance the fraction of ﬁrms outside the inaction region, they increase mediumterm employment and generate output overshoot.

The third ﬁeld of application is a trade theory. Melitz (2003) investigates the eﬀect of
trade on the welfare and aggregate productivity. He extends a heterogeneous ﬁrm model
with ﬁrm’s entry/exit to a trade model with monopolistic competition, and compares the
economies with and without a trade opportunity. The main result is that the aggregate
productivity and welfare would improve through reallocation between ﬁrms when the trade
is available for ﬁrms. The intuition is as follows: When the trade becomes available,
only productive ﬁrms expand their share by exporting their products because exporting
products is assumed to be costly. On the other hand, less productive ﬁrms produce just for
the domestic market and shrink their share, or they exit if their expected proﬁt is negative.
As a result, with the trade opportunity, more productive ﬁrms produce more, and then
the aggregate productivity and welfare would improve through the reallocation.

The fourth, and last, ﬁeld of application is public ﬁnance. Gourio and Miao (2010a,b)
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simultaneously incorporate corporate income tax, capital gain tax, dividend tax, and income tax into a heterogeneous ﬁrm model, and quantify the eﬀect of dividend tax reform
introduced in the U.S. in 2003. Gourio and Miao (2010a) investigates the eﬀect of the
permanent change in the dividend and capital gain tax, and argues that the U.S. tax reform increased a long-run capital stock by about 4%. They show that ﬁrm heterogeneity
is important for precisely measuring the eﬀects of tax reforms because the dividend tax
aﬀects long-run capital accumulation through changes in capital allocation between ﬁrms.
They also show that if they ignore the general eﬀect, the eﬀect on capital accumulation
would become about six-times larger. Gourio and Miao (2010b) extends Gourio and Miao
(2010a) by incorporating a risky debt in addition to equity and model the endogenous
choice of corporate capital structure.8 Then they investigate the eﬀect of the temporary
tax cut and its transitional dynamics.

8

While they assume tax deductibility of interest payments, they do not incorporate any ﬁnancial distress
costs into the model but just assume the collateral constraint. Therefore, unlike the current paper, there
is not the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress cost associated with the debt ﬁnancing in
their model.
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Chapter 3

Model
The model is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms
and their endogenous entry/exit like Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Gomes (2001).
In the model, each ﬁrm is hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, but not aggregate
productivity shocks. By this assumption, the model has a competitive equilibrium with a
stationary distribution regarding ﬁrm’s characteristics. In a quantitative part, I consider
this stationary distribution as a counterpart of cross sectional data in the real economy,
and explore the logic behind the stylized facts using artiﬁcial data generated from the
stationary distribution.1
The economy consists of three types of agents: ﬁrms, households and ﬁnancial intermediaries (FI). The ﬁrm produces consumption goods by asset and labor in every period.
It ﬁnances the asset by three ﬁnancing sources. The ﬁrst one is an internal funding generated by the accumulation of their proﬁt. The second one is outside equity coming from
1
As Frank and Goyal (2008) states, the aggregate leverage ratios is very stable over time. This fact
justiﬁes the assumption that there is no aggregate shock.
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the household through an equity market. The third one is a business loan from the FI.
Note that the ﬁrst two sources are listed as “equity” and the third one is listed as “debt”
in a liability side of its balance sheet. As a result of its optimal choices between the three
ﬁnancing sources, the capital structure is determined endogenously in the model.

The household is homogeneous and inﬁnitely lived, and maximizes the lifetime utility
by consumption and labor supply. The household’s ﬁnancial asset consists of the share of
the ﬁrm and the risk-free deposit at the FI. The income consists of wages, dividends on the
share and interests on the deposit. The household uses the income to buy consumption
goods and new shares, and the rest is deposited at the FI at the risk-free rate.

The last agent in the model is the FI. It collects deposit from the household at risk-free
rate and lend it to the ﬁrm as a business loan. Since I assume a competitive FI market,
the FI’s expected proﬁt is zero.2 As to the ﬁnancial contract between the FI and the ﬁrm,
I limit the contract space to a standard one-period debt contract with default costs as in
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007). I do not show that a simple
one-period debt contract is an optimal contract in this model setting, but the fact that it is
one of the most common ﬁnancial contracts in the real economy justiﬁes the assumption.3

2
Actually, since I focus just on a stationary economy, the ex-post FI’s proﬁt is also always equal to zero
due to a law of large number.
3
Limiting the contract space to a one-period debt contract signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the model, but excludes the following more general contract schemes from the contract space in the ﬁrst place. First, I
exclude a dynamic lending contract under asymmetric information as in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)
and Quadrini (2004). Second, I exclude one-period ﬁnancial contracts outside a debt-contract. Gale and
Hellwig (1985) shows that a debt contract would be optimal among general one-period contracts if information frictions between lenders and borrowers and a monitoring cost (or a default cost) exist, but,
unfortunately, I cannot directly utilize their result because the current model is a dynamic model with
persistent idiosyncratic shocks while their model is a static model.
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3.1

Firms

There is a continuum of ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods by asset and labor. In every period,
after the ﬁrm produces ﬁnal goods, it has the following three choices: continue the business,
exit from the economy or default on its loan. There is also a continuum of new entrants.
When they enter the economy, their initial productivity is drawn from some distribution.
Given the initial productivity, the new entrants decide whether they stay or immediately
exit from the economy without producing anything. In a stationary equilibrium, the distribution of ﬁrm’s characteristics is “stationary” in the sense that it does not change before
and after the ﬁrm’s entry/exit because their entry/exit is oﬀset each other.

3.1.1

Technology

The ﬁrm uses two inputs, asset, k, and labor, l, to produce consumption goods. As to its
technology, I assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,

y = zk αk lαl

.

I assume diminishing return to scale, αk + αl < 1.4 z is an idiosyncratic productivity to
each ﬁrm. This idiosyncratic productivity consists of two parts: persistent component, zp ,
and transitory component, η.
z ≡ zp · η
4

This assumption makes a ﬁrm size matter. If the technology is constant return to scale and there is
heterogeneity in ﬁrm’s productivity, it would be eﬃcient that the ﬁrm with the highest productivity uses
all asset and labor, and the ﬁrm’s distribution would be degenerate.
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The persistent part follows the AR(1) process after log-transformation,

log(zp,t ) = ρ log(zp,t−1 ) + ϵt where ϵt ∼ N (µϵ , σϵ )

(3.1)

and produces the heterogeneity in characteristics of ﬁrms such as size and capital structures.
The transitory component, on the other hand, follows a Normal distribution after logtransformation.
log(ηt ) ∼ N (0, ση )

3.1.2

Proﬁt

A competitive consumption goods market is assume. As a result, the price level of the
consumption goods is the same for all ﬁrms, and it is normalized to one. Then the revenue
(i.e., the price times the amount of sale) is equal to the amount of sale, zk αk lαl .
In order to make it easy to deﬁne the ﬁrm’s dynamic optimization problem, I deﬁne the
optimal labor choice as a static problem ﬁrst. I assume that the ﬁrm chooses the number
of employees for the current period after the realization of the persistent component of its
productivity, zp,t , but before the realization of the transitory component of its productivity,
ηt .5 Let l∗ be the optimal level of labor input,
{
l∗ (k; zp , w) = argmaxl zp k αk lαl −

}
wl
|{z}

(3.2)

labor cost

where w is a wage rate. Note that zp k αk lαl is an expected revenue of the ﬁrm at the
5

I need this assumption to account for a very persistent autocorrelation process of labor in data. If
the ﬁrm can change the number of employees after it knows the transitory component of its productivity,
then the autocorrelation of labor process would be very volatile because it reﬂects the ﬂuctuation of the
transitory component in every period.
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moment they choose the level of labor input because E[η] = 1 and Cov(zp , η) = 0.
Given the optimal choice of labor, l∗ (k; zp , w), I deﬁne the ﬁrm’s proﬁt before an interest
payment, a tax payment and depreciation (so called, EBITDA) as follows:

π(k; z, w) = zk αk l∗αl − wl∗ −

cf
|{z}
f ixed cost

The ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost, cf , in every period when it continues its operation. The
ﬁxed cost gives unproductive ﬁrms an incentive to shut down their business and exit from
the economy. Without the ﬁxed cost, the lower bound of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt would be zero
and no ﬁrms would have incentive to exit from the economy. Moreover, the ﬁxed cost
induces an economy of scale, which is an important mechanism in the model. Actually,
without the ﬁxed cost, ﬁrm’s proﬁtability measured by ROA is almost independent of ﬁrm
size and productivity, zp , because productive ﬁrms get large and proﬁtable.

3.1.3

Evolution of the Firm’s Balance Sheet

Figure 3.1 represents a typical ﬁrm’s balance sheet at the beginning of period. k is a
physical asset and n is the amount of equity at the beginning of period. When the amount
of asset is more than that of equity, i.e., k − n > 0, then k − n is the amount of debt. When
k − n > 0, the ﬁrm uses two diﬀerent ﬁnancing sources, equity and debt ﬁnance. The ﬁrm
pays interests to the FI and dividends to the household. A debt contract between the ﬁrm
and the FI is deﬁned as a combination of the amount of debt and the interest rate assigned
on the debt (k − n, r). On the other hand, when the amount of asset is less than that of
equity, i.e., k − n < 0, then k − n is the ﬁrm’s deposit at the FI. In this case, I assume that
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Figure 3.1: Balance Sheet at the Beginning of Period

the return of the ﬁrm’s deposit is equal to the risk-free rate, rf .6
Let the ﬁrm’s equity at the end of the period be e. Given the amount of asset, k,
the amount of equity at the beginning of the period, n, a debt contract, (k − n, r), the
productivity, z, and wage, w, its EBITDA, which is denoted by π(k; z, w), is determined.
Given the ﬁrm’s EBITDA, the ﬁrm’s equity at the end of the period, e(k, n; z, r, w), is
determined as follows:
[
]
e(k, n; z, r, w) = (1 − τc ) π(k; z, w) − δk − r(k − n) + n

where δ is a depreciation rate of the physical asset and τc is the tax rate of corporate
income tax. The inside of the bracket is a taxable income, which is EBITDA minus the
depreciation of asset and an interest payment. This deﬁnition of the taxable income is
6
Under this setting, the ﬁrm cannot have both debt and deposit simultaneously. Since a number of ﬁrms
have both of them in the real economy, it is an interesting extension to allow it.
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consistent with the tax system in many countries including the U.S. After paying the
[
]
corporate income tax, its current proﬁt, (1 − τc ) π(k; z, w) − δk − r(k − n) , is determined.
Thus the law of motion of the ﬁrm’s equity basically says that the equity at the end of
the period is the sum of its equity at the beginning of the period, n, plus its current proﬁt.
An important point here is that this tax system gives the ﬁrm a huge incentive to use
debt ﬁnance instead of equity ﬁnance or internal funding due to the tax deductibility of
interest payments. That is, the ﬁrm can decrease the amount of the corporate income tax
by increasing the amount of debt, (k − n), because the corporate income tax is levied on
the ﬁrm’s income after interest payments.

3.1.4

Dynamic Optimization

Figure 3.2 summarizes the timing of the ﬁrm’s decision. Given the amount of equity at
the end of period, e(k, n; z, r, w), the ﬁrm solves two dynamic optimization problems. The
ﬁrst one is continue/exit/default decision and the second one is an investment decision.
In the rest of this subsection, I explain those two dynamic optimization problems step by
step.
First of all, let me deﬁne the ﬁrm’s dividend, d(k ′ , n′ ; e, k), as follows:

d(k ′ , n′ ; e, k) =






(1 − τd )[e(k, n; z, r) − (1 − τc )g(k ′ , k) − n′ ],

d≥0





(1 + λ)[e(k, n; z, r) − (1 − τc )g(k ′ , k) − n′ ],

d<0

where k ′ and n′ are the asset and equity in the next period, respectively. g(k ′ , k) is a
downward adjustment cost, which the ﬁrm has to pay when it decreases the amount of
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Figure 3.2: Timing of Firm’s Decision

asset from k to k ′ . That is, it is deﬁned as

g(k ′ , k) = max{ξ((1 − δ)k − k ′ ), 0} where 0 ≤ ξ < 1

This type of adjustment cost is often called a partial investment irreversibility and used
in many corporate ﬁnance and macroeconomics papers including Abel and Eberly (1994)
and Veracierto (2002).7 The above deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s dividend basically says that
the dividend, d, is deﬁned as what the ﬁrm owns at the end of the period, e(k, n; z, r),
minus what the ﬁrm keeps for the next period as its equity, n′ , and the adjustment cost,
(1 − τc )g(k ′ , k). That is, the dividend is determined as a residual when the ﬁrm makes
its investment and ﬁnancing decision, i.e., it chooses k ′ and n′ . A little bit complicated
point here is that the ﬁrm faces diﬀerent frictions depending on whether the amount of its
7

Note that the adjustment cost is parallel to the ﬁring tax assumed in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
While ﬁrms need to pay a linear adjustment cost when they decrease the amount of labor in their model,
ﬁrms have to pay the same type of cost when they decrease assets in my model. Thus I expect similar
eﬀects in both models.
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dividend is positive or negative. When it is positive, the ﬁrm has to pay the dividend tax.
Its tax rate is denoted by τd . On the other hand, when the dividend is negative, it means
that the amount of equity ﬁnance is positive, and, in this case, it has to pay a proportional
ﬂotation cost for equity ﬁnancing, λ. The ﬂotation cost is introduced to capture the costs
such as fees paid to securities companies.8

Exit Decision
The ﬁrst dynamic optimization problem for the ﬁrm is a discrete choice about whether the
ﬁrm continues its business. As Figure 3.2 describes, after its proﬁt is determined, the ﬁrm
has three choices: continue, exit, or default. The discrete choice problem is formulated as
follows:
}

{
v̂(e, k; zp ) = max

v(e, k; zp ) , d(0, 0; e, k) ,
| {z } | {z }
exit

continue

0
|{z}
def ault

The ﬁrst term in the brace is the option to continue the business. v(e, k; zp ) is the ﬁrm’s
value when it decides to continue the business given the ﬁrm’s equity, e, asset, k, and
productivity, zp . I will deﬁne v(e, k; z, r, w) later. The second choice is to quit the business
and exit from the economy. In this case, the ﬁrm would sell all of its assets and payout
d(0, 0; e, k), the dividend when k ′ = n′ = 0. Note that the ﬁrm distributes the rest of
money to households after it pays back all of its debt to the FI when the ﬁrm exits form
the economy. The third and last choice is to default on its loan. In this case, the ﬁrm

8

Gomes (2001) estimates the ﬂotation cost and argues that there is a ﬁxed ﬂotation cost as well as a
variable cost. Hennessy and Whited (2007), on the other hand, argues that a marginal ﬂotation cost is not
constant, but increasing. Despite these estimations, I use a linear ﬂotation cost for simplicity.
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gets nothing, but does not have to pay anything due to the limited liability assumption.
Thus a diﬀerence between “exit” and “default” in the model is that when it chooses to
exit, it has to pay back all of its debt to the FI, but when it chooses to default, it does
not have to pay it back. Therefore, if the ﬁrm expects that some money will be left even
after paying back all debt, the ﬁrm would choose to exit rather than default. The other
diﬀerence between exit and default is that when the ﬁrm declares default, it may continue
its business by getting minimum ﬁnancial support from the FI. I will explain more about
the response of the FI to defaulting ﬁrms when I describe the FI’s behavior in the next
section.
Let h(e, k; zp ) be the policy function of the discrete decision problem. First, h(e, k; zp ) =
1 if the ﬁrm continues its business. Second, h(e, k; zp ) = 2 if the ﬁrm exits from the
economy. Finally, h(e, k; zp ) = 3 if the ﬁrm defaults on its loan.
Even when the ﬁrm chooses to continue its business in the above endogenous exit
decision, I assume that the ﬁrm is hit by an exogenous exit shock with probability χ.
When the ﬁrm is hit by the exogenous exit shock, it must exit from the economy.9 Given
the exogenous exit shock, the value function v(e, k; zp ) is deﬁned as follows:

v(e, k; zp ) = (1 − χ) · ṽ(e, k; zp ) + χ · d(0, 0; e, k)

where ṽ(e, k; zp ) is the value of the ﬁrm given that it continues the business. This value is
9
This shock is introduced in order to capture the fact that big ﬁrms also exit from the economy as well
as small ﬁrms in data. Without the exogenous exit shock, only small ﬁrms would exit from the economy
in the model, because ﬁrm size and proﬁtability are strongly correlated and proﬁtability is the only reason
to exit from the economy in the model. The exogenous exit is a little ad-hoc assumption, but it is justiﬁed
by the fact that ﬁrms are sometimes hit by some exogenous shocks (scandals, disasters, no successors and
so on) in the real economy.
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deﬁned in the ﬁrm’s maximization problem about investment and ﬁnancing below.

Investment and Financing Decision
The second maximization problem for the ﬁrm is investment and ﬁnancing decision. The
ﬁrm faces the second problem only when the ﬁrm chooses to continue its business (i.e., it
chooses the ﬁrst option in the ﬁrst maximization problem above) and it is not hit by the
exogenous exit shock. In this problem, the ﬁrm simultaneously chooses the size of balance
sheet (i.e., the amount of asset, k ′ ) and its capital structure (i.e., the amount of equity n′ )
for the next period. I assume that the ﬁrm signs a one-period debt contract (k ′ − n′ , r′ )
with the FI to use debt ﬁnancing. The value function, ṽ(e, k; zp ), is deﬁned as follows:
{

′

′

ṽ(e, k; zp ) = max
d(k , n ; e, k) + βEzp′ |zp ,η
′ ′ ′
n ,k ,r

s.t. FI’s zero proﬁt condition

[

]}
v̂(e(k , n ; z , r ), k ; z )
′

′

′

′

′

′

(3.3)

(3.4)

where d is the amount of dividends and β is a discount factor. Note that I formulate the
contractual problem as if the ﬁrm chooses the lending rate in a debt contract, r′ , subject
to the FI’s zero proﬁt condition (i.e., an individual rationality condition for the FI), which
will be deﬁned in the next section. The interest rate is determined as a result of the
contract negotiation, but it is a popular way to formulate a contractual problem. The
dividend is determined as a residual when the ﬁrm chooses k ′ and n′ given e, k and zp .
The future value of the ﬁrm in this problem is v̂(e, k; zp ), the value of the ﬁrm before it
decides continue/exit/default, because the maximization problem in the next period will
start with the discrete choice again.
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In this maximization problem, I assume that the ﬁrm must choose the asset size and
capital structure so that the liquidation value of the asset plus its deposit must be more
than the sum of the ﬁxed cost, cf , and the corporate income tax. That is,

(1 − ξ)(1 − δ)k ′ > cf + corporate income tax

(3.5)

This assumption is needed to prevent ﬁrm’s “wait and see” attitude. Without this assumption, unproductive ﬁrms would wait one period without producing anything in order to
see their productivity in the next period rather than immediately exit from the economy,
and then the ﬁrm distribution would have a strange shape.10 This condition is basically a
technical assumption, but it can be interpreted as follows: The ﬁrm would not be trusted
by business partners and not be able to continue its business unless it has enough physical
assets to cover at least the ﬁxed cost and the corporate income tax payment.

3.1.5

New Entrants

Lastly, I characterize the optimization of new entrants. I assume that the potential entrants
can enter the economy freely, and their initial productivity follows a cumulative distribution
function, ζ(z). Under the environment, they enter the economy if
∫
{zp :v(0,0;zp )>0}

v(0, 0; zp )dζ(zp ) ≥ ce

10

(3.6)

The ﬁrm prefers to take such an attitude because it does not have to pay anything including the ﬁxed
cost and the corporate income tax when the ﬁrm declares default. Therefore, the cost for waiting one
period is very little compared with its option value to wait.
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where ce is an entry cost. If the mass of entrants is positive, this condition should be
satisﬁed with equality. Otherwise, an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms would enter the economy.11

3.2

Financial Intermediary

The ﬁnancial intermediary (FI) takes an important role in the model. It receives deposit
from the representative household at risk-free rate, rf , and then it extends a business loan
to the ﬁrm through a one-period debt contract, (k − n, r). Since the business loan is pooled
inside the representative FI, a law of large number works perfectly and the idiosyncratic
risks of the ﬁrms in the portfolio are vanished. As a result, since there is not an aggregate
uncertainty in the model, the risk premium of the portfolio is zero even though there is
the credit risk of each ﬁrm.
After they sign the contract, the lending business in the model proceeds as follows:
If the ﬁrm does not default, the FI simply would get (1 + r)(k − n) as is promised in
the debt contract. A complicated thing is the FI’s response to defaulting ﬁrms. When
the ﬁrm declares default, ﬁrst, the FI would take everything from the ﬁrm. That is, it
would take the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, π, and asset, (1 − δ)k. Then, the FI has to pay a default
cost, which is proportional to the amount of asset, γ(1 − δ)k. It represents the costs to
go through the default process including attorney fees.12 Lastly, the FI has to choose
11

This setting is almost the same as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), but the timing of entry is a
little bit diﬀerent from theirs. In their model, new entrants enter the economy after the exit decision by
incumbent ﬁrms and the entrants produce for at least one period regardless of their productivity. On the
other hand, in the current model, I assume that entrants enter the economy before the exit decision, and
the entrants may exit right after their entry without producing anything if the value for the ﬁrm’s owner
is negative. This assumption about entrants is similar to that in Melitz (2003).
12
As is easily shown, if the default cost does not exist, the existence of the FI would be almost irrelevant
to the ﬁrm’s investment decision under an optimal contract. That is, the allocation would be the same as
the case that the ﬁrm can directly borrow money from the household at the risk-free rate.
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one of the following two options: provides the defaulting ﬁrm with a minimum ﬁnancial
support (i.e., debt forgiveness) in order for the ﬁrm to remain a going concern, or liquidates
the ﬁrm. Roughly speaking, the ﬁrst and second choice correspond to Chapter 11 and 7,
respectively.

As to the ﬁrst choice, the amount of the ﬁnancial support is denoted by b(k; zp ), and
implicitly deﬁned using the value function for the ﬁrm before the exogenous exit, v(e, k, zp ),
as follows:
v(b(k; zp ), k; zp ) = 0 .

The equation means that when the ﬁrm’s equity at the end of period is equal to b(k; zp ), it
is indiﬀerent for the ﬁrm between exiting from the economy and continuing the business.
That is, the FI would increase the ﬁnancial support to the defaulting ﬁrm up to the point
where v(b(k; zp ), k; zp ) = 0, and make the ﬁrm continue its business. This response assumes
that the FI itself is not able to operate the business, and can be interpreted either that
the FI allows the defaulting ﬁrm to continue its business or that the FI takes the business
and sells it to another entity. On the other hand, when the FI chooses not to support the
ﬁrm but to liquidate it, the FI has to pay a liquidation cost, g(0, k), i.e., the downward
adjustment cost to decrease the amount of their asset to zero. Therefore, the FI selects
either of them by comparing b(k; zp ) and g(0, k), and choose the smaller one.

I assume a competitive market for FIs. Since the FI’s expected proﬁt becomes zero
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under this assumption, the FI can be reduced into the following zero proﬁt condition:

′

′

[∫

x(zp′ ) [

π(k ′ ; zp′ , η ′ , w′ ) + (1 − γ)(1 − δ)k ′
η
{
}]
− min b(k ′ ; zp′ ), g(0, k ′ ) dΠ(η ′ )
]
[
]
′
′
′
′
+ 1 − Π(x(zp )) · (1 + r )(k − n )

(1 + rf )(k − n ) = Ezp′ |zp

(3.7)

The left hand side of the equation is the FI’s funding cost. That is, the FI collects deposit
from the household at risk-free rate, rf . The right hand side is its expected earnings.
Π(η ′ ) is a cdf of the transitory productivity shock, η ′ . Given the cdf and the persistent
productivity, zp , a threshold of η ′ for default, x(zp ), is deﬁned as follows:

max {v(e(k, n; x · zp , r), k; zp ) , d(0, 0; e(k, n; x · zp , r), k)} = 0

This condition means that when the persistent productivity is equal to zp , the ﬁrm chooses
to default if and only if the transitory productivity shock, η, is lower than x(zp ).13
The integral in the ﬁrst and second line of the right hand side represents the case of
default. As I explained, when the ﬁrm chooses to default, the FI takes all of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and asset, π(k ′ ; z ′ , w′ )+(1−γ)(1−δ)k ′ .14 After it pays the default cost, γ(1−δ)k ′ , it
provides the minimum ﬁnancial support, b(k; zp ), to make the ﬁrm remain a going concern,
or liquidates the ﬁrm by paying a liquidation cost, g(0, k). The third line of the right hand
side is the case that the ﬁrm pays back the loan and the interest as is promised in the debt
13

Since both v(e(k, n; z, r), k; zp ) and d(0, 0; e(k, n; z, r), k) are increasing functions with respect to η, the
ﬁrm adopts a threshold policy rule.
14
Note that since the ﬁrm optimally chooses to default, the return for the FI in the default case must be
lower than a nominal return of the debt.
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contract. Since the probability of this case is [1 − Π(x(zp′ ))], the expected return is equal
to [1 − Π(x(zp′ ))] · (1 + r′ )(k ′ − n′ ).
The FI’s zero proﬁt condition is relevant to the real economy in the model, because the
ﬁrm solves the contract problem subject to this condition when it makes the investment
decision. That is, the ﬁrm optimally chooses the amount of its debt and the interest rate
applied to the debt subject to the zero proﬁt condition for the FI.15

3.3

Household

I assume a representative household. It supplies labor force, Lst , to the ﬁrm and obtains
wage, wt Lst . Also, since the household owns all ﬁrms in the economy as a stockholder, it
gets the aggregate dividend, Dt , as another source of its income. It allocates the incomes
to the consumption, Ct , and savings at the FI, St , at the risk-free rate, rf . The budget
constraint is

Ct + St+1 = [1 + rf (1 − τi )]St + Dt + wt Lst + Tt

(3.8)

where τi is the tax rate on the interest income and Tt is a lump sum transfer from the
government. The household maximizes its lifetime utility by consumption and labor supply.
I assume log-utility for consumption and liner disutility for labor supply for simplicity as
15
Under standard parameter values, the proﬁt for the ﬁrm and the FI move in opposite directions with
respect to the interest rate. Therefore, the zero proﬁt condition would be always binding when the ﬁrm
optimally solves the contract problem. When the ﬁrm’s productivity is very low and the amount of its debt
is big, there may not exit the interest rate to achieves zero proﬁt for the FI. I assume that the ﬁrm must
decrease the amount of debt up to the point where the interest rate which achieves zero proﬁt for the FI
exits.
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in Gomes (2001). Then the maximization problem for the household becomes

max
s

Lt ,St+1 ,Ct

E

∞
∑

β t [log(Ct ) − ALst ]

(3.9)

t=0

subject to the budget constraint stated above. β is a discount factor. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to Lst and St+1 are as follows, respectively.

wt
=A
Ct

and

1 + rf (1 − τi )
1
= βE
Ct
Ct+1

(3.10)

In a quantitative part of this paper, I will focus only on a stationary equilibrium. Since all
aggregate variables and prices are constant in a stationary equilibrium, those ﬁrst order
conditions are rewritten as

w
=A
C

and

β=

1
1 + rf (1 − τi )

(3.11)

and the budget constraint is

C = rf (1 − τi )S + D + wLs + T .

(3.12)

In this budget constraint, D and T are exogenously given to the household. Then, given
these two values and wage, w, the household chooses C, S, and Ls . I will use the ﬁrst
order conditions and the budget constraint to compute a stationary equilibrium.

In the above formulation of the household problem, the share of each ﬁrm does not
show up in the budget constraint, and, as a result, the household is assumed not to choose
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the amount of the share at all and just get the aggregate dividend. Instead of assuming
that the aggregate dividend is distributed to the household in every period, I can formulate
the household problem so that the household chooses the amount of share in every period.
Since the household’s behavior in the alternative formulation eventually gives the same
allocation in a stationary equilibrium, the diﬀerence between the two formulations does
not matter for quantitative results.16

3.4

Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions

Now that I complete the description of the individual ﬁrm behavior and the household
decision, I aggregate all ﬁrms and characterize a stationary equilibrium. In a stationary
equilibrium, since all prices and aggregate variables are constant by deﬁnition, wage, w,
can be dropped from the list of state variables. Then each ﬁrm can be speciﬁed by the
amount of equity, the amount of asset and the level of productivity, (e, k, zp ). Let µ(e, k, zp )

16

However, by explicitly formulating the endogenous choice of the share by the household, the following
two things, which are implicitly assumed in this paper, can be derived as a result of the household’s
optimization. First, the return on equity is equal to the risk-free rate, 1 + rf (1 − τi ), in equilibrium. It
sounds a little bit strange because it means that an equity premium is equal to zero, but it is a natural
consequence of the household’s optimal portfolio choice without an aggregate uncertainty. Second, the
discount rate, β, for the household is equal to that for the ﬁrm. In general, the ﬁrm’s discount rate
should be stochastic when it is owned by the household, but in this paper, since I assume that there is no
aggregate uncertainty and focus just on a stationary equilibrium, the discount factor for the ﬁrm becomes
also constant and equal to β.
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be the mass of ﬁrms at the state (e, k, zp ). The law of motion of the ﬁrm distribution is

=

µt+1 (e′ , k ′ , zp′ )





∫
∗
∗
′
I{η≥x(z ′ )} · I{e′ =e∗ (n∗ ,k∗ ;η·z ′ )} · I{k′ =k∗ (e,k;zp )} · (1 − s1 (e , k ; zp ))

p

(e,k,zp ,η,zp′ ) 



p

+I{η<x(zp′ )} · I{e′ =b(k′ ;zp′ )} · I{k′ =k∗ (e,k;zp )} · (1 − s2 (k ∗ ; zp′ ))





× µt (e, k, z) · Pr(zp′ |zp ) · dΠ(η)dzp dkde
∫
+M
zp

I{e′ =e∗ (n∗ (0,0;zp′ ),k∗ ;zp′ )} · I{k′ =k∗ (0,0;zp′ )} · (1 − s3 (zp′ ))dζ(zp′ )

(3.13)

where I is an indicator function that I = 1 if the inside of the brace is true. k ∗ and n∗ are
the ﬁrm’s optimal policy functions at the state (e, k, z) for asset and equity, respectively.
s1 (e, k ′ ; zp′ ) and s2 (k ′ ; zp′ ) are indicator functions that they are equal to one when the ﬁrm
at the state (e, k ′ ; zp′ ) chooses to exit from the economy in the case of default and not
default, respectively. Similarly, s3 (zp′ ) is equal to one when the entrant chooses not to
enter the economy (i.e., exit from the economy immediately without producing anything).
e∗ (n∗ , k ∗ , η·zp′ ) is the amount of equity at the end of period when the ﬁrm optimally chooses
the amount of asset, k ∗ , and the amount of equity, n∗ , and the persistent and transitory
productivity are zp′ and η, respectively. The ﬁrst line of the inside of the integral represents
the case of default and the second line represents the case of not default. The last term of
the right hand side represents new entrants. M is the mass of the new entrants. Note that
the amount of equity and asset for the new entrants are zero. A stationary distribution is a
distribution µ∗ satisfying µt+1 = µt = µ∗ . Practically, it is derived by starting an arbitrary
distribution and applying the above law of motion until the distribution converges to a
stationary distribution.
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Once we derive a stationary distribution, µ∗ , the aggregate asset, equity, labor demand
and output is deﬁned as follows:
∫
Asset : K =
∫
Equity : N =
∫
Dividend : D =

k ∗ (e, k; zp )µ(e, k; zp )dedkdzp

(3.14)

n∗ (e, k; zp )µ(e, k; zp )dedkdzp

(3.15)

d(k ∗ (e, k; zp ), n∗ (e, k; zp ); e, k)µ(e, k; zp )dedkdzp

(3.16)

∫

(
)
l∗ k ∗ (e, k; zp ); zp′ µ(e, k; zp )P r(zp′ |zp )dΠ(η)dedkdz (3.17)

d

Labor Demand : L =
∫
Output : Y =

[

ηzp′ k ∗ (e, k; zp )αk l∗ (k ∗ (e, k; zp ); zp′ )αl

]
− cf µ(e, k; zp )P r(zp′ |zp )dΠ(η)dedkdz

(3.18)

Also the aggregate adjustment cost induced by frictions as follows:
∫
Adj. Cost : G =
∫
+

g(k ∗ (e, k; zp ), k)µ(e, k; zp )dedkdzp
[
]
g(0, k ∗ (e, k; zp )) I{η≥x(zp′ )} · s1 (e∗ , k ∗ ; zp′ ) + I{η<x(zp′ )} · s2 (k ∗ ; zp′ )
× P r(dzp′ |zp )dΠ(η)µ(e, k, z)dedkdz

∫
+
∫
+

I{e∗ <n∗ (e∗ ,k∗ ;zp′ )} λ(e∗ − n∗ (e∗ , k ∗ ; zp′ ))µ(e, k; zp )P r(zp′ |zp )dΠ(η)dedkdz
I{η<x(zp′ )} γk ∗ µ(e, k; zp )P r(zp′ |zp )dΠ(η)dedkdz

(3.19)

The ﬁrst line is the downward adjustment cost of asset. The second line is the liquidation
cost for exiting ﬁrms. The third line is the ﬂotation cost of equity and the fourth line is
the default cost. All costs are aggregated using a stationary distribution and assumed to
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be thrown away into the sea. The last aggregate variable is the tax revenue:
∫
Tax Revenue : T =

τc · (π(k ∗ ; ηzp′ , w) − δk ∗ − r∗ (k ∗ − n∗ ) − g(k ∗ (e∗ , k ∗ ; ηzp′ ), k ∗ ))
× P r(dzp′ |zp )dΠ(η)µ(e, k, z)dedkdz

∫
+
∫
+

τd · I{d(k∗ ,n∗ ;e,k)>0} · d(k ∗ (e, k; zp ), n∗ (e, k; zp ); e, k)µ(e, k, z)dedkdz
τi · rf · (K − N)µ(e, k; zp )dedkdz

(3.20)

Once the aggregate variables are deﬁned, the next step to characterize the stationary
equilibrium is to deﬁne market clearing conditions, which are satisﬁed in equilibrium. In the
economy, there are three markets: labor, consumption goods and saving, and all markets
should clear in a stationary competitive equilibrium. First, the market clearing condition
for the saving market is

S =K−N

(3.21)

The left hand side is the saving by the representative household and the right hand side is
the aggregate debt owned by ﬁrms. This equation means that all savings are used as debt
in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet. Next, the market clearing condition for the labor market is

Ls = Ld

(3.22)

Lastly, the market clearing condition for the consumption goods market is deﬁned as
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follows.

C = Y − δK − G

(3.23)

This condition says that the aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate output minus
the depreciation of asset and the adjustment costs stemming from frictions. Note that the
aggregate corporate investment in a stationary equilibrium is equal to the depreciation
of asset. Therefore, δK is the amount of equilibrium investment, and the gross domestic
product (GDP) is deﬁned in the model as follows.

GDP = C + δK

Thus, GDP is also equal to the aggregate output minus the aggregate adjustment costs.

3.5

Stationary Competitive Equilibrium

Finally, I close the model by charactering a stationary competitive equilibrium as follows:

Definition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of (1) allocation rules of labor, saving, and consumption for the household, Ls (D, T; w), S(D, T; w), and C(D, T; w),
(2) allocation rules of labor, asset, and equity for each firm, l∗ (k; zp , w), k ∗ (e, k; zp , w),
and n∗ (e, k; zp , w), (3) an continue/exit/default decision for each firm, h(e, k; zp ), (4)
value functions for each firm, v̂(e, k; zp ), v(e, k; zp ), and ṽ(e, k; zp ), (5) aggregate variables,
K, N, Ld , D, Y, G, and T, (6) a wage rate, w, and a lending rate, r, (7) a stationary
distribution, µ∗ (e, k, zp ), and mass of entrants, M , such that:
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1. the household decision rules satisfy its FOCs and the budget constrait;
2. the firm decision rules, a lending rate, and value functions solve the maximization
problems for each firm;
3. the market clearing conditions are satisfied;
4. the free-entry condition is satisfied;
5. the aggregation rules (i.e., consistency) are satisfied;
6. the stationary distribution, µ∗ , satisfies the law of motion with µt+1 = µt = µ∗ .
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Chapter 4

Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, I compute a stationary competitive equilibrium. To begin with, I calibrate
the model using empirical results or so that the model accounts for some moments of
the U.S. data. After the calibration, I numerically compute a stationary equilibrium and
describe the properties of the stationary equilibrium.

4.1

Calibration

I set one period in the model to one year. Since I have already speciﬁed functional forms of
most functions in the model, the rest that I have to do is to specify the parameter values.
I start with relatively standard parameters. I set the risk-free rate, rf , to 4%. It is a
little higher than the risk-free rate in the real economy, but since the equity premium is
equal to zero in the model due to the lack of aggregate uncertainty, this return is interpreted
as a more general return in the economy. By the Euler equation of the household, the
discount rate for the household, β, is equal to 1/(1 + rf (1 − τi )) because I just focus
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on a stationary equilibrium. In the baseline model, wage, w, is set to 1.0 and the labor
disutility parameter, A, is chosen so that an equilibrium labor supply is equal to 0.6, which
is an average employment rate in the U.S., as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). For
technology parameters, ﬁrst I choose the degree of diminishing returns, αk +αl . This varies
across previous works, but I set the parameter to 0.85 as in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and
Veracierto (2002). Then I set αk so that the aggregate investment-output ratio is equal to
16%. αk = 0.25 gives the target value of the aggregate investment-output ratio, and then
αl = 0.85 − 0.25 = 0.6. Finally, I set δ = 0.078 so that the aggregate capital-output ratio
in the stationary equilibrium is equal to 2.0. The target investment-output ratio and the
target capital-output ratio are taken from NIPA data for the last 15 years in the U.S.
Next, I set the values of the friction parameters, which are relatively speciﬁc to the
current model. First, I set the ﬂotation cost of equity funding to λ = 0.059 according to the
estimation in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Next, I calibrate the downward adjustment
cost of asset, ξ. Actually, the estimation of the adjustment cost varies among empirical
works.1 Among them, Hennessy and Whited (2005) structurally estimates the cost using
COMPUSTAT data. They conclude that the cost is about 41% and I adopt their estimation
value in this paper, i.e., I set ξ(1 − τc ) = 0.41. I adopt their estimate, not only because this
is around the median value among empirical estimates, but also because this paper is close
to their model and uses COMPUSTAT as a target too. The last parameter is the default
cost, γ. “Doing Business” database at the World Bank collects default costs all over the
world. According to the database, a default cost in the U.S. is about 7% of defaulting
1

As a lower bound of the estimation, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimates the cost using ﬁrm micro
data and concludes that the cost is about 20% of asset. As the upper bound of the estimation, Ramey and
Shapiro (2001) estimates the cost using aero space industry data. According to their estimation, the cost
varies among the types of assets, but it is around 60%.
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Table 4.1: Calibration
Parameters
Discount rate, β
Labor disutility, A
Return to scale, αk + αl
Technology, αk
Depreciation, δ
Scrapping cost, ξ
Equity funding cost, λ
Default cost, γ

Values
0.966
1.25
0.85
0.25
0.078
0.41
0.059
0.07

Risk free rate = 0.04
labor supply = 0.6
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
Investment/Output = 0.16
Capital/Output = 2.0
Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Estimate by World Bank

ﬁrm’s estate value, and so I set γ = 0.07. The parameters up to this point is summarized
in Table 4.1.
As to the tax rates in the model, I set the dividend tax rate, τd , and the interest income
tax rate, τi , to 12% and 29.6%, respectively, according to Graham (2000). I also set the
corporate income tax rate, τch , to 35% for ﬁrms with positive proﬁt according to Graham
(2000), but, on the other hand, I set the corporate income tax rate for ﬁrms with negative
proﬁt, τcl , to 20% because the corporate income tax system in many countries including
the U.S. adopts a progressive tax rate system. While ﬁrms with negative proﬁt do not pay
any corporate income tax in the real economy, I choose non-zero tax rate because the loss
in the current period will be deducted from the future taxable income. In that sense, I set
the corporate income tax rate for exiting ﬁrms with negative proﬁt to zero because their
loss will never be deducted from their taxable income in the future. This corporate income
tax system is still too simpliﬁed compared with the real tax system, but this is rich enough
to capture the progressivity in the corporate income tax system in the real economy and
aﬀects the quantitative results later. The tax rates used in the model are summarized in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Tax Rates
Parameters
Corporate incomes, τc
Current proﬁt > 0, τch
Current proﬁt < 0, τch

Dividends, τd
Interest incomes, τi

Values
0.35
0.20
0.12
0.296

In this paper, there are two types of ﬁrm exit: exogenous and endogenous exit. In the
model, only small ﬁrms exit from the economy endogenously or through default because
ﬁrm size and productivity are positively correlated. As I mentioned, the exogenous exit is
introduced in order to capture the fact that large ﬁrms exit from the economy. Therefore,
I calibrate the exogenous exit rate, χ, to 2%, which is the exit rate for ﬁrms with more
than 150,000 employees in COMPUSTAT. Given this exogenous exit rate, the value of the
ﬁxed cost, I calibrate the ﬁxed cost, cf , so that the total exit rate including the exogenous
one is equal to 7%, which is a total exit rate calculated by COMPUSTAT in the last 5
years.2
For the productivity distribution of entrants, λ(zp ), I assume that the distribution is
the normal distribution. Then, the parameters to be speciﬁed are the mean and variance
of the distribution. First, I set the mean of the entrant’s productivity distribution to the
unconditional mean of productivity, µϵ /1 − ρ, as in Gomes (2001). Given this value of
mean, I calibrate the variance of the entrant’s productivity distribution so that the size
distribution of entrants matches that in COMPUSTAT.
2
Someone may notice that this is lower than the exit rate computed by the U.S. Census data, which
is around 9%. This diﬀerence stems from the fact that COMPUSTAT consists of relatively good ﬁrms
because this database contains only listed ﬁrms in the U.s. I assume that ﬁrms exit from the economy at
period t if they existed in period t − 1, but they do not exist in period t. Of course, there are other reasons
for them to disappear from the database such as mergers or stopping listing, but I think that the value is
a rough proxy for the exit rate.
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Finally, I should set parameter values regarding the stochastic process of two types of
productivity. First, the unconditional mean of the persistent productivity shock, µϵ , is
chosen so that the average ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees matches that in
COMPUSTAT. The ﬁrm size can be used as a target value because the size and productivity
are strongly correlated. Next, to calibrate the productivity processes, I utilize the fact that
the autocorrelation process of labor is very persistent while the capital structure process
is less persistent. First, I calibrate the AR(1) parameter ρ and the standard deviation σϵ
so that the autocorrelation of labor process and the standard deviation of residuals in this
autocorrelation process match those in COMPUSTAT. This procedure is the same as in
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that they use establishment data rather than ﬁrm
data. Then I choose ρ = 0.97 and σϵ = 0.115. Second, given those parameter values for the
persistent productivity process, I adjust the standard deviation of transitory productivity,
ση , so that the autocorrelation process of leverage matches that in COMPUSTAT. The
autocorrelation process of ﬁrm’s leverage is less persistent than that of labor, but it is also
fairly persistent as Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) shows. Thus I set the value of the
standard deviation small enough to account for the leverage process. I choose ση = 0.35.
Under the value, the leverage process is close to data in terms of AR(1) parameter and the
standard deviation of residuals.3 After I set all parameter values, I discretize the AR(1)
process of persistent productivity, log(zp,t ) = ρ log(zp,t−1 ) + ϵt where ϵt ∼ N (µϵ , σϵ ), by
Tauchen’s method.

3
The autocorrelation and the standard deviation of residuals are 0.83 and 0.14 in the data and 0.83 and
0.15 in the model.
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4.2

Results

In this subsection I compute a stationary equilibrium and describe some properties of the
equilibrium. In particular, I describe the following four things: dispersion of leverage,
the ﬁrm’s policy functions, distribution of ﬁrm size and productivity, and relationship of
leverage to ﬁrm size. The algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium is based on
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and it is summarized in Appendix A.

4.2.1

Distribution of Leverage

Does the model account for the dispersion of leverage observed in data? This question
itself is an interesting economic question because logic behind the widespread distribution
of corporate capital structure is not fully investigated, but it is also a good ﬁrst step
to check the model ﬁt. If the model cannot account for the dispersion of leverage, it
does not seem meaningful to use the model for other purposes including counterfactual
experiments. I calculate the equilibrium distribution of leverage in the model using the
stationary distribution, µ(e, k; zp ). I use COMPUSTAT as the data source in this paper.
See Appendix C for more detail about the data and deﬁnitions of variables.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are the histograms of the ﬁrms’ leverage in the model and the
data.4 While the dispersion is more widespread in the model, I conclude that the model
successfully accounts for the distribution of leverage in the data. In particular, the model’s
equilibrium distribution captures the following two key features in the data: ﬁrst, a lot
of ﬁrms take very low leverage, and, second, some ﬁrms take very high leverage and, as a
4
In both histograms, “Average” means the simple average of ﬁrms’ leverage and “Aggregate” means the
aggregate equity divided by the aggregate debt plus equity.
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of Leverage (Model)

Figure 4.1: Histogram of Leverage (Data)
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result, the distribution is very widespread.

4.2.2

Firm’s Optimal Behavior

To know the mechanisms behind the equilibrium distribution of leverage, it is helpful to
explore the ﬁrm’s optimal behavior. Figure 4.3 is a 3-dimensional graph showing the
optimal choice of asset. The X and Y axes are the amount of equity at the end of period,
e, and the productivity, zp , respectively. Some comments are in order. First, the optimal
amount of asset is monotonically increasing with respect to the ﬁrm’s productivity, but
it is barely aﬀected by the amount of equity except ﬁrms with very low productivity.
Since the equity is a main source of their internal funding, this policy function implies
that the outside ﬁnancing constraint aﬀects only very unproductive ﬁrm’s investment, and
irrelevant to most ﬁrms’ investment. This policy function of asset is consistent with the
recent ﬁndings about the ﬁrm size distribution. Angelini and Generale (2008) uses Italian
ﬁrm data and argues that the ﬁnancial constraints are important only for small ﬁrms, but
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play little role for determining the ﬁrm size distribution as a whole.Second, there is an
inaction area where the optimal amount of asset is ﬂat, which is common for the model
with investment irreversibility. This feature makes the ﬁrm size deviate from the optimal
one and the adjustment of ﬁrm size sluggish.

Figure 4.4 shows the policy function of equity, nt+1 , with respect to the amount of
equity at the end of the previous period, et . The dotted line is the policy function for
a low productivity ﬁrm and the solid one is that for a high productivity ﬁrm. First, we
notice that the optimal amount of equity is close to the 45 degree line in most cases for
both a low and a high productivity ﬁrm. This behavior implies that the ﬁrm uses its
internal fund as much as possible for investment, and ﬁlls its ﬁnancing deﬁcit (the gap
between investment and the amount of internal funding) mainly by debt. This behavior
is basically consistent with empirical results (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and
Leary and Roberts (2005)). As is pointed by Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Frank
and Goyal (2008), even though the ﬁnancing behavior in a dynamic trade oﬀ model is
mostly determined by the trade oﬀ between the tax beneﬁt and the ﬁnancial distress costs,
the resulting behavior looks similar to the implication of the pecking order theory. I will
investigate which frictions play a key role to induce such a ﬁnancing behavior through
counterfactual experiments in later sections.

Another noticeable thing is that the ﬁrm uses the outside equity only if its productivity
is low (i.e., ﬁrm size is small) and the amount of internal funding is small. It is basically
consistent with the empirical ﬁndings by Leary and Roberts (2010), which argues that
ﬁrms issuing new outside equity by violating the pecking order are small, less proﬁtable
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and much less leveraged.5 The lending rates for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivities give
some intuitions behind this behavior. Figure 4.6 shows the lending rate in the optimal
contract. The horizontal axis is the ﬁrm’s leverage. The doted, dashed and solid line is the
lending rate for the low, middle and high productivity ﬁrm, respectively.6 It shows that
the lending rate is increasing with respect to leverage. In particular, it shows that it is
very costly for a low productivity ﬁrm to increase leverage. Due to such a high lending rate
for a low productivity ﬁrm, the ﬁrm would decrease its leverage by increasing the outside
equity funding up to the point where it can use debt ﬁnance at reasonable lending rate.7
Figure 4.6 also shows that a high productivity ﬁrm can use debt ﬁnance almost at risk-free
rate. It implies that a high productivity ﬁrm accumulates its internal funding only due to
the precautionary motive.
Considering those properties of equilibrium lending rates and leverage, the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of leverage is basically consistent with the survey data in Graham and Harvey
(2001). CFOs in the survey answer that the most important determinants of corporate
capital structure are “credit ratings” and “ﬁnancial ﬂexibility.” The credit ratings seem
relevant to corporate capital structure in this model because taking high leverage induces
high credit spread in the model. Moreover, the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility also seems relevant in
this model because it exactly corresponds to precautionary motive to accumulate internal

5

See also Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender (2009) for similar results.
Someone may notice that the level of credit spreads is small for all ﬁrms compared with the data. Those
tight credit spreads in this model are not surprising because aggregate uncertainty is not incorporated in
this model. Actually some papers such as Gomes and Schmid (2010) and Chen (2010) argue that aggregate
uncertainty is a key component to account for a plausible level of credit spread. Incorporating aggregate
uncertainty to account for the level of credit spreads is an interesting extension of this model.
7
In equilibrium, a defaulting ﬁrm is often in such a situation. That is, the defaulting ﬁrm gets some
debt forgiveness from the FI, but, at the same time, it must get some outside equity in order to borrow
money from the FI at reasonable lending rate. I think that such a simultaneous debt and outside equity
ﬁnance for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms is common in the real economy.
6
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Figure 4.3: Policy Function of Asset

Figure 4.4: Policy Function of Equity
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Figure 4.5 shows the policy function of leverage, (kt+1 − nt+1 )/kt+1 . The horizontal
axis is the amount of equity, et . Again, the dotted line is the policy function for a low
productivity ﬁrm and the solid one is that for a high productivity ﬁrm. First, it shows
that a high productivity ﬁrm is more leveraged. There are two reasons. The ﬁrst reason
is that the optimal asset size of the high productivity ﬁrm is larger and the ﬁnancing
deﬁcit is usually ﬁlled by debt. The second reason is that debt is more accessible for
8
Graham and Harvey (2001) states that “they remain ﬂexible in the sense of minimizing interest obligations, so that they do no need to shrink their business in case of an economic downturn.”
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the high productivity ﬁrm than the low productivity ﬁrm because the equilibrium lending
rate is low. Second, it shows that the policy functions of leverage are decreasing with
respect to the amount of equity, et . This is because the ﬁrm can use et as its internal
funding and decrease leverage. This policy function of leverage gives a rough logic behind
the stationary distribution of leverage: Because the average proﬁt of incumbent ﬁrms is
positive (otherwise, they choose to exit from the economy), they accumulate its internal
funding and decrease their leverage as time goes on. This is why there are many ﬁrms with
very low leverage in the stationary equilibrium. On the other hand, ﬁrms with low internal
funding and high productivity take high leverage. For example, if the ﬁrm is suddenly hit
by a good productivity shock or if the ﬁrm is so young that it does not have enough time to
accumulate internal funding, it would be highly leveraged. It means that ﬁrms’ evolution
with entry/exit is an important mechanism to account for the dispersion of leverage in
data.

4.2.3

Firm Size and Productivity

Next, I describe the ﬁrm size and its productivity. Figure 4.7 represents the stationary
joint distribution of asset size and productivity. The horizontal axis is the amount of assets
in log-scale and the vertical axis is productivities. There is a clear positive relationship
between them. That is, productive ﬁrms own more assets (i.e., get larger) than less productive ones do. While this positive correlation between ﬁrm size and productivity is very
intuitive, it plays an important role in a quantitative part of this paper.
Figure 4.8 - 4.10 are the marginal stationary distributions of the ﬁrm’s productivity,
asset, and equity, respectively. The distribution of productivity is slightly skewed to right
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because low productivity ﬁrms cannot survive and only high productivity ﬁrms stay in the
economy. That is, the cleansing eﬀect through entry/exit works as a mechanism to shape
the stationary distribution in the model. The distribution of equity is less skewed compared
with the distribution of asset, and so the distribution of leverage is skewed rightward.

4.2.4

Firm Age and Leverage

Finally, I brieﬂy describe the relationship between ﬁrm age and capital structure. As many
papers including Cooley and Quadrini (2001) argue, young ﬁrms use more debt than old
ﬁrms. This is the case in the current model too. Figure 4.11 shows the fraction of entrants
and ﬁrms older than 10 years in each category of leverage. It shows that while the fraction
of entrants decreases as the leverage increases, the fraction of ﬁrms older than 10 years
increases as the leverage increases. For example, while half of zero leveraged ﬁrms are
ﬁrms older than 10 years, less than 5% of them are entrants. The tendency that young
ﬁrms use more debt than old ﬁrms plays a key role in counterfactual experiments later.

69

Figure 4.7: Distribution of Productivity and Asset
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Chapter 5

Model Implication

In this section, I show some implications of the model. First, I explore the logic behind
the relationship of leverage to ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. I review the stylized facts about
the relationships, and then check whether the model account for them by the joint distributions of ﬁrm’s characteristics and the estimation using artiﬁcial data generated from the
stationary distribution.

Next, I conduct some counterfactual experiments. In the experiments, I focus on the
following two questions. First, I measure the relative importance between determinants
of the ﬁrm’s capital structure by changing the degree of each friction. Second, I measure
the eﬀect of the corporate income tax and the default cost on aggregate variables such as
output, consumption, and so forth.
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5.1

Relationship of Leverage to Firm Size and Proﬁtability

In this subsection I explore the logic behind the empirical relationship of leverage to ﬁrm
size and proﬁtability. In order to measure the relationship, ﬁrst, I compare the joint
distribution of the ﬁrm’s characteristics in the model with that in the data. Then I conduct
some regressions using the artiﬁcial data generated from the stationary distribution, and
compare the estimation results with those using the real economic data.

5.1.1

Joint Distributions of Firm’s Characteristics

First, I look at the joint distribution of proﬁtability and ﬁrm size. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show
the relationship between ROA and log of employment size in the data and the model,
respectively. The both ﬁgures show similar “economies of scale.” That is, ROAs of large
ﬁrms are higher than those of small ﬁrms. Moreover, the larger the ﬁrm size is, the slighter
the economies of scale are. This feature is not surprising because the economies of scale
are induced just by the ﬁxed cost, cf .
Second, I look at the joint distribution of leverage and ﬁrm size. Figure 5.3 and 5.4
show the relationship between the book leverage and log of employment size in the data and
the model, respectively. The both ﬁgures show moderately positive correlation between
them.
Third, I look at the joint distribution of leverage and proﬁtability. Figure 5.5 and 5.6
show the relationship between the book leverage and ROA in the data and the model,
respectively. Those ﬁgures show that ﬁrms with very low ROA are ones with very low
leverage. Those extreme ﬁrms seem to induce the positive relationship between leverage
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and proﬁtability. Since Figure 5.1 and 5.2 tell us that those ﬁrms all are also small ﬁrms,
I may be able to eliminate the eﬀects of those ﬁrms by controlling for ﬁrm size.

5.1.2

Estimation Results

In this subsection I estimate the following reduced form equations, which are familiar in
the empirical corporate ﬁnance1 :

Book Leveragei = β0 + β1 log(Employeei ) + ϵi

(5.1)

Book Leveragei = β0 + β1 ROAi + ϵi

(5.2)

Book Leveragei = β0 + β1 ROAi + β2 log(Employeei ) + ϵi

(5.3)

where i represents each ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst and second equations, I estimate the plain
relationship of leverage to ﬁrm size and proﬁtability, respectively. The number of employees
and ROA are used as proxies for ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. In the last equation, I estimate
the eﬀect of ﬁrm size and proﬁtability on leverage after controlling for the other variable.
As econometricians usually put many explanatory variable at a time to measure their
marginal eﬀect, the last equation is the most familiar equation in the empirical corporate
ﬁnance literature.

Estimation Using Real Data

Table 5.1 shows the results of estimation using the real economic data. First, it shows
that the simple correlation between leverage and ﬁrm size in data is positive, which is
consistent with previous empirical papers. Second, it shows that the simple correlation
1

Those equations are similar to those in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002)
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Figure 5.1: ROA and Employment Size (Data)

Figure 5.2: ROA and Employment Size (Model)

Figure 5.3: Leverage and Employment Size (Data) Figure 5.4: Leverage and Employment Size (Model)

Figure 5.5: Leverage and ROA (Data)

Figure 5.6: Leverage and ROA (Model)
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between leverage and proﬁtability is also positive. Since previous empirical papers do not
focus on such a simple correlation between them, the positive correlation may be a little
bit surprising. The coeﬃcient on ROA, however, turns out to be negative when I estimate
the same equation using only large ﬁrm data, whose size is larger than the average. The
result is consistent with previous empirical papers including Rajan and Zingales (1995),
which points out that the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability becomes negative
as ﬁrm size gets large. Finally, when I estimate the relationships of leverage to ﬁrm size
and proﬁtability simultaneously, the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability turns out to be negative
too.

The negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability after controlling for other
ﬁrm characteristics has attracted attentions of many academic researchers because it is
diﬃcult to justify the negativity by the traditional static trade oﬀ theory. For example,
Graham (2000) calculates the tax beneﬁts for each ﬁrm, and argues that proﬁtable and
liquid ﬁrms puzzlingly have low leverage. Hennessy and Whited (2005) accounts for the
negative relationship by a dynamic trade of model. Their result is striking in this literature,
but they do not mention the relationship of leverage to ﬁrm size. Thus they do not
mention the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the negative relationship too. Strebulaev (2007) adopts
a similar quantitative method to this paper and accounts for the negative relationship
by incorporating the cost to rebalance the ﬁrm’s capital structure. The mechanism in his
model is clear and plausible, but as I explained in Introduction, it is doubtful that the model
still accounts for the negative relationship when the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing deﬁcit endogenously
responses to its productivity.
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Table 5.1: Estimate Results
Data
Variable
log(Employee)

0.026

Book Leverage
(Large ﬁrms only)

–

[0.025 0.027]

ROA

–

0.030
[0.029 0.031]

0.068

-0.334

-0.066

[0.059 0.077]

[-0.356 -0.312]

[-0.076 -0.057]

Model
Variable
log(Employee)

0.019

Book Leverage
(Large ﬁrms only)

–

[0.017 0.021]

ROA

–

0.021
[0.019 0.024]

0.024

-0.109

-0.037

[0.013 0.036]

[-0.137 -0.082]

[-0.050 -0.024]

As the real economic data, I use pooling panel data of COMPUSTAT in a recent 20 years. See Appendix
C for more detail. When I estimate by the real economic data, I add the time dummy for each year and
the industry dummy based on SIC code. When I estimate by the model output, I randomly draw 5,000
samples from the stationary distribution. I drop observations as outliers if their ROA is more than upper
3% tile or less than lower 3% tile. “Large ﬁrms only” means that I drop the observation from the dataset
if the ﬁrm size is smaller than the average.

Estimation Using Model Output

In order to estimate the same equations using the model output, I adopt the following
two step procedure: First, I randomly draw artiﬁcial data from the equilibrium stationary
distribution. Then, I conduct the regressions using the artiﬁcial data. This procedure is
the same as in Gomes (2001).
Table 5.1 shows the estimation results using the artiﬁcial data from the stationary
distribution. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are slightly diﬀerent from those in the
estimation using the real economic data, but the estimation using the model output replicates the sign of coeﬃcients. That is, the coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size and proﬁtability is positive
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when I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and those variables, but the coefﬁcient on proﬁtability turns out to be negative once I limit the data to large ﬁrms or once
I control for ﬁrm size.

5.1.3

The Logic behind the Estimation Results

What is the logic behind the estimation results? There are two key mechanisms to understand the estimation results. The ﬁrst key mechanism is the diﬀerence between responses
to the persistent and the transitory productivity shock: While the persistent productivity
shock can either increase or decrease leverage, the transitory productivity shock decrease
leverage.
Let me explain the relationship between the persistent productivity shock and leverage.
On the one hand, ﬁrms with high persistent productivity tend to be more leveraged because
the positive productivity shock increases their optimal asset size (and, as a result, increases
their ﬁnancing deﬁcit) as well as it makes debt ﬁnance more accessible under the trade
oﬀ. It is easy to check the mechanisms by comparing the optimal leverage between a high
and a low productivity ﬁrm in Figure 4.5. On the other hand, ﬁrms with high persistent
productivity tend to be less leveraged because they have ample cash ﬂow and use it as
internal funding. It is easy to check the mechanism by the fact that the policy function of
leverage is decreasing with respect to the amount of equity in Figure 4.5. As a result of
these two forces in opposite directions, the eﬀect of the persistent productivity on leverage
is ambiguous in general. However, the positive eﬀect is quantitatively larger than the
negative one, and so the correlation between the persistent productivity and leverage is
positive for most ﬁrms.
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In contrast, the transitory productivity shock just increases the amount of internal
funding in the current period, but it obviously does not aﬀect its optimal asset size and
ﬁnancing deﬁcit. Therefore, it just decreases its leverage.
The other key mechanism behind the estimation is the economies of scale (i.e., positive
correlation between proﬁtability measured by ROA and ﬁrm size) caused by the ﬁxed cost,
cf . Actually, without the ﬁxed cost, the relationship between ROA and ﬁrm size would
be ambiguous and almost uncorrelated, because both the denominator and the numerator
of ROA (i.e., ﬁrm size and EBITDA) would increase as the persistent productivity, zp ,
increases. With the ﬁxed cost, however, ROA and ﬁrm size are positively correlated because the ﬁrm’s EBITDA would increase faster than its size as the persistent productivity
increases.
In summary, the eﬀects of two diﬀerent productivities on leverage are

Corr(lev, zp ) > 0 & Corr(lev, η) < 0

(5.4)

where lev is the ﬁrm’s leverage, zp is the persistent productivity, and η is the transitory
productivity. The economies of scale induces

Corr(f s, ROA) > 0

(5.5)

where f s is ﬁrm size.
Then, the logic behind the estimation results can be understood as follows. First, the
positive correlation between leverage and ﬁrm size is induced by the positive correlation
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between persistent productivity, zp , and ﬁrm size, which is shown in Figure 4.7, because

Corr(lev, zp ) > 0 & Corr(zp , f s) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev, f s) > 0

Intuitively, because ﬁrms with high persistent productivity get large and increase their
leverage simultaneously, some kind of spurious correlation between ﬁrm size and leverage
shows up.
Next, I consider the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability. The proﬁtability
measured by ROA could be positively correlated with leverage due to the positive correlation between ﬁrm size and leverage and the economies of scale,

Corr(lev, f s) > 0 & Corr(f s, ROA) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev, ROA) > 0 .

On the other hand, the proﬁtability could be negatively correlated with leverage through
the transitory productivity, η,

Corr(lev, η) < 0 & Corr(η, ROA) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev, ROA) < 0

Note that the transitory productivity, η, and ROA are positively correlated because the
transitory productivity increases the ﬁrm’s proﬁt (numerator) but does not aﬀect the ﬁrm
size (denominator) at all.
When I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and ROA, the sign is ambiguous in general because of the potential positive and negative correlations stated above.
However, both in the data and the model, the positive eﬀect seems dominant because the
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persistent productivity aﬀects the ﬁrm’s behavior more than the transitory productivity
does. Then we obtain
Corr(lev, ROA) > 0

both in the data and the model.

When I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and ROA using only large firm
data, ROA is almost independent of ﬁrm size because the economies of scale caused by the
ﬁxed cost, cf , become less relevant as ﬁrm size gets larger. Therefore, only the negative
correlation between leverage and ROA through the transitory productivity remains, and
then I obtain
Corr(lev, ROA) < 0

both in the data and the model.

Similarly, when I regress leverage on ﬁrm size and ROA, the ﬁrm size absorbs the
positive eﬀect of ROA on leverage. Therefore, ROA captures only the negative eﬀect
through the transitory productivity, and so the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability turns out to be
negative, and I obtain
Corr(lev, ROA) < 0

both in the data and the model.
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5.2

Cross Sectional Determinants of the Firm’s Capital Structure

What is the key determinant of the ﬁrm’s capital structure? This is a recurrent question
in the corporate ﬁnance literature. In this subsection I try to answer this question through
counterfactual experiments. The experiment is divided into two parts: First, I explore
what makes the ﬁrm use debt ﬁnance. To answer the question, I drop the advantage of
debt one by one, and see how the average and aggregate leverage would change. Second,
I explore what makes the ﬁrm use equity. To answer this question, I drop the advantages
of equity one by one. Finally, I summarize the implications of this experiment.

5.2.1

What Makes Firms Use Debt?

What makes the ﬁrm use debt rather than equity? The most natural guess is the tax beneﬁt
generated by the gap between the corporate income tax rate and the interest income tax
rate. Therefore, as the ﬁrst experiment, I lower the corporate income tax rate to 28%,
which is lower than the interest income tax rate, 29.6%, and recalculate the stationary
equilibrium. It is expected that the ﬁrm’s leverage would signiﬁcantly decrease because
there is no tax beneﬁt under this corporate income tax rate. Table 5.2 shows the ﬁrm’s
average and aggregate leverage in the new stationary equilibrium. The result is a little
bit counterintuitive. It shows that the ﬁrm’s leverage would decrease a little, but the
magnitude of the change in leverage is very small. This result is in contrast to previous
works. For example, Hennessy and Whited (2005) states in their counterfactual experiment
that:
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Table 5.2: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverage

Baseline

τch
0.35
0.28
0.28
0.35

τcl
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20

λ + τd
0.179
0.179
0.0
0.0

γ
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07

ξ
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41

Average
0.34
0.33
0.00
0.23

Aggregate
0.29
0.26
0.00
0.51

When we lower the maximal corporate tax rate below the tax rate on interest
income, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm always retains funds and only ﬁnances with equity.
This contrast stems from the assumption about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. That is, without ﬁrms’
entry/exit as a standard dynamic trade oﬀ model, all ﬁrms would eventually use 100%
equity by accumulating retained earnings if the tax beneﬁt did not exist. However, with
ﬁrms’ entry/exit like this paper, young ﬁrms always exist in a stationary distribution and
use debt in the process of their evolution as long as outside equity is more costly than
debt. This can be checked by Figure 4.11, which shows young ﬁrms use more debt than
old ﬁrms. This result of counterfactual experiment implies that frictions in outside equity
caused by the dividend tax and the ﬂotation cost of equity are also important for capital
structure. It may answer the question why debt ﬁnance was popular ﬁnancing tool before
the corporate income tax was introduced.
Next, as the second experiment, I eliminate the dividend tax and the ﬂotation cost of
equity in addition to the tax beneﬁt. That is, I set λ + τd = 0 in addition to τc = 28%.
The result is consistent with what we expect. Since the ﬁrm has no incentive to use debt,
it uses no debt and the average and aggregate leverage in equilibrium become zero.
Do the results up to this point imply that the ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend
tax are the main reasons to use debt? It is not so simple. As the third experiment, I set
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λ + τd = 0, but turn the corporate income tax rate back to τc = 35%. The result is a little
bit puzzling. The average leverage decreases as is expected, but the aggregate leverage
increases. The diﬀerent responses between the average and aggregate leverage imply that
small ﬁrms use less debt while big ﬁrms use more.
To understand the logic behind the result, it is helpful to summarize the eﬀect of λ+τd ,
the ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax, on leverage.2 As I explained, the ﬁrm’s
optimal behavior in this model is like the behavior implied by the pecking order theory:

Internal Fund ≽ Debt ≽ Outside Equity

and, the claim here is that λ + τd induces this preference order. This claim is not new, but
was pointed by Stiglitz (1973). First, let me explain why the ﬂotation cost of equity and
the dividend tax make ﬁrms prefer debt to outside equity. The reason why the ﬂotation
cost of outside equity makes ﬁrms use debt is straightforward. As for the dividend tax,
please imagine the situation where the ﬁrm got $100 funding in the past and is now paying
it back with $20 proﬁt. If the ﬁrm got the $100 as debt, it would pay back $120 − τi × $20,
but if the ﬁrm got it as outside equity, it would pay back only $120 ×(1 − τd ). Therefore,
with τd > 0, outside equity would be costly compared with debt. Next, I explain why the
ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax make ﬁrms use debt rather than inside equity.
Imagine that the ﬁrm has $100 as its cash ﬂow. The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst choice is to keep it as its
internal fund. The second choice is to pay it back to the household as the dividend and
ﬁnance investment by debt. If λ + τd > 0, the ﬁrm would hesitate to choose the second
2
As is easily shown, both the ﬂotation cost and the dividend tax are like transaction costs of outside
equity funding, and so the relevant thing is the sum of them, λ + τd .
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one (i.e., pay dividend and use debt ﬁnance) because the ﬁrm may be in ﬁnancial distress
and need the money. That is, if the ﬁrm do not have enough internal funding in the case
of ﬁnancial distress, the ﬁrm would have to use outside equity, which is very costly under
λ + τd > 0, to deal with the ﬁnancial distress. Thus, the ﬂotation cost of equity and the
dividend tax make ﬁrms keep more internal fund for the precautionary reason. In that
sense, λ + τd can be interpreted as a kind of ﬁnancial distress cost because outside equity
funding is one of ways to deal with ﬁnancial distress. If λ + τd = 0, ﬁnancial distress would
not be so serious problem for the ﬁrm because the ﬁrm uses outside equity funding to pay
back its debt.
As a whole, the eﬀect of λ + τd on leverage is ambiguous in general because they
encourage the ﬁrm to use more internal funding rather than debt, but encourage the ﬁrm
to use debt rather than outside equity. However, the relative magnitude depends on the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position. λ + τd tends to increase leverage of rich ﬁrms because the choice
between internal funding and debt is more relevant for them. On the other hand, λ + τd
tends to decrease leverage for poor ﬁrms because the choice between debt and outside
equity funding is more relevant for them. Since the ﬁrm size is strongly correlated with its
ﬁnancial position, the diﬀerence in the relative magnitude induces the diﬀerent responses
between the average and aggregate leverage in the experiment.

5.2.2

What Makes Firms Use Equity?

The second question in the experiment is why the ﬁrm uses equity rather than debt.
To answer the question, I drop frictions which make the ﬁrm use equity, and recalculate
the stationary equilibrium. The most natural guess is the default cost, γ. It makes debt
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unattractive because the equilibrium lending rate is determined considering the endogenous
default and its cost. Therefore, as the ﬁrst experiment, I set the default cost to zero,
γ = 0. As a result of this change, it is expected that the ﬁrm’s leverage would signiﬁcantly
increase. Table 5.3 shows that when the default cost is eliminated, the ﬁrm’s leverage
is almost doubled (Average: 31% → 61%). Some papers assume that a risk-free bond
without default is an only choice of debt ﬁnance, but the result of the experiment implies
that a default cost is an important determinant of capital structure, and the risk-free bond
approach is not a good approach to discuss corporate capital structure.
As the next experiment, I increase the corporate tax rate for ﬁrms with negative corporate income, τcl , from 20% to 35%. By doing so, I eliminate the tax disbeneﬁt for
unproﬁtable ﬁrms. The tax disbeneﬁt for unproﬁtable ﬁrms emerges because the corporate income tax rate for them is usually lower than the interest income rate due to the
progressive tax rate system. Table 5.3 shows that the average and aggregate leverage increase as is expected (Average: 31% → 50%). The result implies that the tax disbeneﬁt
is also an important determinant making ﬁrms use equity.
When I eliminate both the default cost and the tax disbeneﬁt, ﬁrm’s leverage increases
to 75%. What else makes ﬁrms use equity? The answer is the wedge in equity funding
caused by the ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax, λ + τd . Thus I eliminate the
ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax, λ + τd , as the next experiment. The result
shows that the average and aggregate leverage becomes more than 90%, almost equal to
one, because there is no reason to use equity.3
The result of the experiment up to this point implies that even if the investment
3
It is not equal to one because of the constraint (3.5). When I eliminate the constraint, the average
leverage becomes one.
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Table 5.3: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverage

Baseline

τch
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.35

τcl
0.20
0.20
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.20

λ + τd
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.0
0.179

γ
0.07
0.0
0.07
0.0
0.0
0.07

ξ
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.21

Average
0.34
0.61
0.50
0.75
0.91
0.48

Aggregate
0.29
0.39
0.46
0.62
0.99
0.44

irreversibility exists (i.e., ξ > 0), the ﬁrm’s leverage would become close to one once
γ = 0, λ + τd = 0, and τcl > τi . It is a little bit surprising because some papers including
Hennessy and Whited (2005) emphasize the investment irreversibility as a main ﬁnancial
distress cost. Does the result of the counterfactual experiment imply that the investment
irreversibility is not an important determinant? Table 5.3 shows it is not true, but that
if the investment irreversibility is mitigated, the average and aggregate leverage would
substantially increase. It implies that the investment irreversibility has a strong eﬀect
on the ﬁrm’s leverage as long as it coexists with other frictions. The intuition is that if
λ+τd = 0, the ﬁrm does not have to conduct any ﬁre sale of asset to deal with the ﬁnancial
distress because outside equity is a cheap way to deal with the ﬁnancial distress. However,
if λ + τd > 0, the ﬁre sale becomes the cheapest way to deal with the ﬁnancial distress
and the degree of investment irreversibility become a relevant determinant for the ﬁrm’s
capital structure choice.

Let me summarize the implications of the counterfactual experiments. First, even
if the tax beneﬁt does not exist, the aggregate capital structure would not signiﬁcantly
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change. This result stems from the assumption about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. That is, without
ﬁrms’ entry/exit as a standard dynamic trade oﬀ model, all ﬁrms would eventually use
100% equity by accumulating retained earnings; but with ﬁrms’ entry/exit, young ﬁrms
always exist and use debt in the process of accumulating retained earnings. This result
implies that the wedge in equity funding caused by the dividend tax and the ﬂotation
cost of equity are also important determinant of capital structure. Second, the wedge in
equity ﬁnance caused by the dividend tax and the ﬂotation cost of equity have ambiguous
eﬀects on leverage, which depend on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position and proﬁtability. That
is, with the wedge in equity funding, rich and big ﬁrms would decrease their leverage while
poor and small ﬁrms increase their leverage. Third, the default cost makes debt ﬁnance
very unattractive. This implies that it is important to model endogenous default when we
discuss corporate capital structure. Fourth, the tax disbeneﬁt coming from the gap between
τi and τcl also makes ﬁrms prefer equity to debt. This implies that the progressive tax rate
system for the corporate income tax signiﬁcantly aﬀects corporate capital structure. Fifth,
the investment irreversibility magniﬁes the unattractiveness of debt, but it would have no
eﬀect on leverage if the wedge in equity ﬁnance does not exist.

5.3

Aggregate Eﬀects of Tax Cut and Default Cost

In this subsection, I measure the eﬀect of the corporate income tax and the default cost on
aggregate variables such as output, investment, and consumption. The policy experiments
to measure the eﬀects of the corporate income tax and the default cost are not new, but
it is worthwhile to analyze their eﬀect under the endogenous corporate capital structure
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choice.

5.3.1

Corporate Income Tax Rate

A corporate income tax cut is an interesting policy experiment using this model because
incorporating the corporate income tax into macroeconomic models is not easy task. For
example, since the corporate income is always zero in a standard neoclassical growth model,
it is impossible to discuss the eﬀect of corporate income tax. Even if the corporate income
is not zero, the diﬀerence between debt and equity ﬁnance must be modelled to separately
discuss the corporate income tax and the dividend tax.4
Table 5.4 shows the result of a tax cut in the corporate income tax rate. If the corporate
income tax rate is decreased from 35% to 28%, the aggregate variables would increase so
much. The output, productivity, consumption and capital would increase by 6.0%, 4.3%,
4.8% and 12.2%, respectively. Note that the growth of capital is pretty large compared with
other variables. This implies that the corporate income tax is a kind of capital taxation
and strongly depresses corporate investment.
This strong response of investment to the corporate income tax is one of reasons why the
ﬁrm’s leverage does not signiﬁcantly decrease when the tax beneﬁt is eliminated. That is,
the strong growth in investment expands the ﬁnancing deﬁcit and increases their leverage
because the gap is usually ﬁnanced by debt.

4
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) distinguish the corporate income tax from the dividend tax by dividing
the ﬁrm’s capital into a tangible and an intangible one.
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Table 5.4: Changes in Aggregate Variables

Output
Productivity
Consumption
Capital

5.3.2

τc : 0.35 → 0.28
+ 6.0%
+ 4.3%
+ 4.8%
+ 12.2%

γ : 0.07 → 0.00
+ 0.7%
+ 0.3%
+ 0.4%
+ 2.2%

Default Cost

Macroeconomic eﬀects of the default cost are emphasized in many papers. In particular,
business cycle models with ﬁnancial frictions use the default cost as a source of the ﬁnancial
acceleration.5 Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model, it is diﬃcult to directly
compare the result in this paper with that in those papers, but it is still worthwhile to
measure the eﬀect of the default cost on the steady state values of aggregate variables.
Table 5.4 shows the eﬀect of the elimination of the default cost. If the default cost
is completely eliminated, i.e., γ = 0, the output, productivity, consumption and capital
would increase by 0.7%, 0.3%, 0.4% and 2.2%, respectively. Even though the elimination
of the default cost increase the aggregate variables, its magnitude is surprisingly small.
The logic behind the very small eﬀect of the default cost on the aggregate variables is
as follows. As the policy function of asset in Figure 4.3 shows, the optimal asset size barely
depends on the amount of equity. It implies that even if the ﬁrm does not have enough
net worth, they would be able to access to debt or outside equity and do not decrease the
investment. Therefore, the default cost aﬀects the ﬁrm’s capital structure a lot, but do
not change the amount of investment. This implies that the eﬀect of the default cost on
5

For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) uses the default cost as the only source of ﬁnancial
acceleration. If there is no default cost in their model, the spread would disappear and, as a result, the
acceleration would not exist in their model.
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aggregate variables may be overstated in the previous literature. That is, the eﬀect might
not be so large if ﬁrms can change their leverage freely.6

6
Note that this model is calibrated by the values of listed ﬁrms. Since the listed ﬁrms are usually rich
and big ﬁrms, the eﬀect of the default cost on relatively small ﬁrms may be overlooked in this model.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a structural model based on the dynamic trade oﬀ theory and
investigate the logic behind cross sectional dispersion of leverage. Unlike other related
works, since the model is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and their endogenous entry/exit, I get not only a certain ﬁrm’s optimal policy but
also an equilibrium distribution regarding a ﬁrm’s characteristics. Also, I incorporate
economies of scale and two types of productivities (persistent and transitory). They are
common features in other literatures, but they have not been considered in the capital
structure literature.
The main ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, I ﬁnd that the equilibrium distribution accounts for the dispersion of capital structure in data. Second, I ﬁnd that it
also accounts for the relationship of capital structure to proﬁtability and ﬁrm size. The
key mechanisms to achieve the relationships are the diﬀerence in responses to persistent
and transitory productivity shocks and economies of scale. Third, I quantify the relative
importance between determinants of the ﬁrm’s capital structure through counterfactual
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experiments. The result of the experiments implies that, among others, even if the tax
beneﬁt does not exist, the ﬁrm would continue to use substantial amount of debt in contrast
to previous works. The logic behind the result is that because ﬁrms’ entry/exit actively
occurs even in a stationary equilibrium, young ﬁrms always exist and use debt until they
accumulate enough internal funding. Fourth, the elimination of the default cost does not
have large eﬀect on aggregate variables such as output, investment, and consumption. This
implies that we have to consider the eﬀect more conservatively.
As future works, it is an interesting extension to incorporate an aggregate uncertainty
into the model and account for the capital structure behavior over business cycles. Chugh
(2010) describes some interesting stylized facts. Also Jermann and Quadrini (2010) argues
that corporate capital structure may play an important role to explain business cycle
ﬂuctuations using more parsimonious model. Incorporating an aggregate uncertainty into
this model may give more micro-founded description about the role of corporate capital
structure over business cycles.
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Appendix A

Algorithm to Compute a
Stationary Equilibrium
In this subsection, I brieﬂy explain about the numerical algorithm that I use to compute the
stationary equilibrium. As I mentioned, I set w = 1.0 and Ls = 0.6 in the baseline model
as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). The basic algorithm to compute the stationary
equilibrium in the baseline model is as follows.
1. Solve the Bellman equations for each ﬁrm under w = 1.0.
2. By the free entry condition, set ce =

∫

V (0, z)dλ(z).

3. Calculate the stationary distribution.
4. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor
supply Ls . Set the mass of entrants M so that the aggregate labor supply is equal
to 0.6.
5. Using this mass of the new entrants M and the stationary distribution, we can
calculate the aggregate consumption C. Then, set A so that the ﬁrst order condition
of the households is satisﬁed.
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Appendix B

Algorithm for Numerical
Experiment
1. Guess the equilibrium wage w∗ .
2. Solve the Bellman equations for each ﬁrm under w∗ .
3. Compare ce and

∫

V (0, z)dλ(z). If the entry cost is equal to the value for the entrants

(i.e., the free entry condition holds), go to the next step. If not, adjust w∗ and go
back to the previous step.
4. Calculate the stationary distribution.
5. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor
supply Ls and aggregate consumption C. Set the mass of entrants M so that the
ﬁrst order condition of the households is satisﬁed.
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Appendix C

Data
I use COMPUSTAT data in recent ten years (1988 - 2008). As other papers using this data
set do, I drop some data based on the following criteria. First, I drop ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
sector and regulated industries because the capital structure in those industries is quite
diﬀerent from other industries.1 I drop observations from the data set if their SIC code is
from 4900 to 4999 or from 6000 to 6999. Second, I drop the observations if the number of
employees, the book asset, the book equity, or book debt is zero or negative.
I use the ﬁrm’s ROA as a proxy for its proﬁtability. ROA in this paper is deﬁned as:
Operating Income Before Depreciation (item 13)
Assets (item 6)

In the previous papers, some deﬁnitions of the ﬁrm’s leverage are proposed. Among them,
I adopt the following deﬁnition:
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34) + Long-Term Debt (item 9)
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34) + Long Term Debt (item 9) + Stockholders Equity (item 216)

Rajan and Zingales (1995) examines several deﬁnitions of leverage, and discusses advantages and disadvantages of each deﬁnition. Then, they argue that the deﬁnition which I
adopt in this paper is closest to the one supposed in the economic model. See Rajan and
Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) for more detail about the deﬁnitions.

1
Chapter 2 of Tirole (2006) reviews these diﬀerences. Also, Adrian and Shin (2008) shows that ﬁnancial
institutions’ behavior to the leverage ratio is quite diﬀerent from that of non-ﬁnancial corporations.
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